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The Immigrant “Other”: Racialized Identity and the
Devaluation of Immigrant Family Relations
ANITA ORTIZ MADDALI*
This Article explores how current terminations of undocumented immigrants’
parental rights are reminiscent of historical practices that removed early
immigrant and Native American children from their parents in an attempt to
cultivate an Anglo-American national identity. Today, children are separated from
their families when courts terminate the rights of parents who have been, or who
face, deportation. Often, biases toward undocumented parents affect
determinations concerning parental fitness in a manner that, while different, reaps
the same results as the removal of children from their families over a century ago.
This Article examines cases in which courts terminated the parental rights of
undocumented parents because of biases about the parents’ immigration status,
language, race, culture, and the belief that life in the United States is better for
children than returning with a parent to a poorer country, such as Mexico or
Guatemala. This Article suggests that these termination decisions are reflective of
tensions around identity and how to cultivate a preferred American identity.
Further, this Article explores how using the law to cultivate a preferred identity
can subvert the constitutional rights of undocumented parents and undermine their
family relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
Her lifestyle, that of smuggling herself into the country illegally and
committing crimes in this country, is not a lifestyle that can provide
stability for a child . . . . A child cannot be educated in this way, always
in hiding or on the run.1
The above quote comes from a juvenile court decision that terminated the
parental rights of Encarnación Maria Bail Romero, an undocumented immigrant
from Guatemala. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested Bail
Romero in 2007 during a workplace raid of the poultry processing plant in Missouri
that had employed her.2 She pled guilty to aggravated identity theft and received a
mandatory two-year sentence.3 Her son, Carlos, was seven months old at the time.4
While incarcerated, a local couple offered to assist Bail Romero’s relatives who
had been caring for Carlos.5 Within a few months of this arrangement, this couple,
without first contacting child welfare services, gave Carlos to another couple that
was interested in adopting a Latino child.6 Two days later, the second couple
moved to terminate Bail Romero’s parental rights and adopt Carlos.7 The juvenile
court eventually terminated Bail Romero’s parental rights and approved the

1. Ginger Thompson, After Losing Freedom, Some Immigrants Face Loss of Custody
of Their Children, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at A15 (quoting the presiding judge). The first
juvenile court decision remains sealed, but a copy of it was allegedly leaked to the New York
Times. Therefore, the information about the first decision could only be obtained from this
New York Times article.
I drafted an amicus brief in this case while working as a staff attorney for the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund.
2. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793, 801 (Mo. 2011).
3. Id. at 802; see also In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477 at *9 (Mo. Cir.
Ct. July 18, 2012) (on file with author) (second termination decision, which, unlike the first
decision, is not sealed). Bail Romero’s conviction preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in
Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 647 (2009) (requiring proof, for purposes of
an aggravated identity theft conviction, that an individual knew that a social security number
or identity card belonged to someone else).
4. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 801.
5. In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *15–16.
6. Id. at *21.
7. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 802 (noting that Carlos’s first overnight
visit with the Mosers was on October 3, 2007, and the Mosers filed the petition on October
5, 2007).
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adoption.8 Bail Romero appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, which reversed
the termination and adoption but remanded the case for a new trial before the
juvenile court.9 In July 2012 the juvenile court once again terminated Bail
Romero’s parental rights and approved the adoption,10 and in October 2013 the
Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court’s decision.11
Undocumented12 parents—like Bail Romero—are losing their parental rights.13
Cases involving improper terminations of undocumented parents’ parental rights
that are appealed are often reversed.14 While this is reassuring, the problem is that
most undocumented parents do not have the resources to appeal, especially when
the parent has already been deported. Even when the problem is corrected, families
face prolonged separations, and if the child is later returned to the parent, the child
must deal with a second separation from his or her adoptive or foster parents.
Moreover, tracking these cases is difficult because juvenile court records are
frequently sealed, and there often is no published opinion.
The federal government deported 46,000 parents of U.S.-citizen children in the
first six months of 2011.15 To determine how these deportations have affected
parents and their children, the Applied Research Center (ARC) conducted a

8. Id. at 804.
9. See id. at 823–24.
10. In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *62.
11. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.), No. SD32228 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 7,
2013).
12. I use the term “undocumented” throughout this Article to describe both those who
entered surreptitiously and those who overstayed a visa. For a more detailed discussion about
terms such as “illegal alien,” “unauthorized,” and “undocumented,” see STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1140–
41 (5th ed. 2009).
13. This problem likely not only affects undocumented parents. Because all
noncitizens—lawful permanent residents and those on a temporary immigrant status, for
instance—can be subject to deportation, all noncitizen families may be at risk of separation.
As of July 2012, 1.4 million immigrants had been deported. Under President Obama’s
administration, 1.5 times more immigrants have been deported compared with the number of
deportations under former President Bush’s administration. Suzy Khimm, Obama Is
Deporting Immigrants Faster Than Bush. Republicans Don’t Think That’s Enough,
WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Aug. 27, 2012, 2:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2012/08/27/obama-is-deporting-more-immigrants-than-bush-republicansdont-think-thats-enough/; see also Helen O’Neill, U.S.-Born Kids of Deported Parents
Struggle as Family Life Is ‘Destroyed,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2012, 3:26 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/25/us-born-kids-deported-parents_n_1830496
.html?.
14. See, e.g., In re Interest of M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832–33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); In re
Interest of V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 490 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); In re Termination of the Parental
Rights of Doe, 281 P.3d 95, 95–96 (Idaho 2012); In re B., 756 N.W.2d 234, 237, 242 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2008); State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 74–75
(Neb. 2009); State v. Mercedes S. (In re Interest of Mainor T.), 674 N.W.2d 442, 449, 464
(Neb. 2004); In re Interest of E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 796 (Tex. 2012).
15. SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED RESEARCH CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE
PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 5
(2011).
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qualitative study on family separations involving undocumented parents in six
states. In six other states, ARC relied upon media and advocacy reports to confirm
the prevalence of these cases. Additionally, it interviewed attorneys, caseworkers,
and officials from foreign consulates in ten other states. ARC’s research confirmed
that parents in detention or facing deportation risk permanent separation from their
children.16 It conservatively estimates that there are 5100 children in foster care in
the United States who have parents who were detained or deported and that should
the rate of these types of separations continue, in the next five years there will
likely be at least 15,000 children who might not be able to reunify with their
parents.17
This Article explores how current terminations of undocumented immigrants’
parental rights are reminiscent of historical practices that removed early immigrant
and Native American children from their parents in an attempt to cultivate an
Anglo-American national identity. Today, children are separated from their
families when courts terminate the rights of parents who have been, or who face,
deportation. Often, biases toward undocumented parents affect determinations of
parental fitness in a manner that, while different, reaps the same results as the
removal of children from their families over a century ago. This Article examines
cases in which courts terminated the parental rights of undocumented parents
because of biases about the parents’ immigration status, language, race, culture, and
the belief that life in the United States is better for children than returning with a
parent to a poorer country, such as Mexico or Guatemala. This Article suggests that
these termination decisions are reflective of tensions around identity and how to
cultivate a preferred American identity.18 Further, this Article explores how using

16. Id. at 22–25. For other publications documenting this problem, see UNIV. OF ARIZ.,
DISAPPEARING PARENTS: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM 2 (2011), http://sirow.arizona.edu/sites/sirow.arizona.edu/files
/disappearing_parents_report_final.pdf (indicating that through its research, attorneys,
judges, and caseworkers all reported experience with cases involving parents in immigration
detention or deportation proceedings); Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration
Enforcement and the Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 114–18 (2011) (noting
that because the child welfare system and ICE do not collect this information, it is difficult to
determine the number of families affected). Rabin does state that the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General reported that from 1998 to 2007, 108,434
parents of U.S.-citizen children were deported. Id. at 114. Additionally, she conducted
surveys and interviews of personnel in the Pima County Juvenile System to determine the
frequency with which children are involved with the child welfare system as a result of a
parent’s deportation. Id. at 115. Based on the information she gathered, Rabin concluded that
“the numbers of such cases in the system suggest that immigration status arises frequently
enough for it to be an issue about which personnel in the child welfare system are aware, but
not so frequently that they are accustomed to dealing with such cases in a prescribed,
uniform manner.” Id. at 118.
17. WESSLER, supra note 15, at 6.
18. Sociologists have defined identities as “linguistic labels, indexes of the self that
individuals simultaneously claim and have imputed to them based on items, such as
residence, group membership, shared social experience, and place identification.” Linda M.
Burton, Raymond Garrett-Peters & John Major Eason, Morality, Identity, and Mental Health
in Rural Ghettos, in COMMUNITIES, NEIGHBORHOODS, AND HEALTH: EXPANDING THE
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the law to cultivate a preferred identity can subvert the constitutional rights of
undocumented parents and undermine their family relationships.
Both immigration and family law “broker boundaries”19 around belonging and
identity. Immigration law sets the parameters around who may enter the
United States and who may remain in the country. Historically, immigration and
citizenship law have used race—however constructed at a particular time—to
determine these parameters. Likewise, economic and political conditions within the
United States have also influenced how immigrant groups are perceived and
treated.20 Immigrants whose culture and values more closely aligned with
Anglo-Protestants of Northern European heritage have historically been favored
under immigration law and have integrated more easily into American society.21
As sociologists Douglas Massey and Magaly Sánchez describe, when natives
view a particular immigrant group with hostility, this can make assimilation and
integration much more difficult for the immigrant.22 Irish, Chinese, Japanese,
Italians, Poles, and Eastern European Jews were all viewed as a threat to American
society at one point, making the process of assimilation more difficult for members
of these groups.23 “[A]ssimilation is about the restructuring of group identities and
the redefinition of social boundaries so that immigrants and their descendants are
perceived and treated by natives as ‘us’ rather than ‘them.’”24 It is a process, and a

BOUNDARIES OF PLACE 91, 101 (Linda M. Burton et al. eds., 2011) (citation omitted). In this
Article, I explore tensions around group identity—American versus other—where
differences in language, culture, race, social experience, and place identification become a
basis for the exclusion, othering, and stigmatization of immigrant newcomers.
19. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & MAGALY SÁNCHEZ R., BROKERED BOUNDARIES: CREATING
IMMIGRANT IDENTITY IN ANTI-IMMIGRANT TIMES 15 (2010) (“Like all human beings,
immigrants and natives have both group and individual identities, and membership in social
categories plays a critical role in how people develop a sense of themselves as social beings.
Whenever two people interact, they engage one another not only as individuals but as
representatives of the social groups to which they belong. In their interaction, they broker
intergroup boundaries and through this process of brokering extract meaning to construct and
modify identity on an ongoing basis.” (internal citations omitted)).
20. See id. at 13 (describing one researcher’s observation that immigrants of European
origin were able to assimilate because of their “whiteness,” the suspension of immigration
from 1930 to 1970, their strong motivation to advance economically, and, most importantly,
the New Deal and the economic strength of the country after World War II).
21. See ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882, at 49 (2004) (The impetus for the quota system was
“the beleaguered feeling of so many old-stock Protestant Americans. Immigrants and their
non-Protestant cultures, they felt, represented a serious and sustained challenge to American
values.”); MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 12 (noting the “massive assimilation
among Euro-Americans by the 1990s” and contrasting it with “segmentation and
transnationalism” of new immigrant groups); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration
Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A “Magic Mirror” Into the Heart of Darkness, 73
IND. L.J. 1111, 1130–31 (1998) (“Despite persistent criticisms, including claims that it
adversely affected U.S. foreign policy interests, the Anglo-Saxon, northern European
preference in the immigration laws remained intact until 1965.”).
22. MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 13–14.
23. Id. at 14.
24. Id.
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difficult one for natives and immigrants.25 Yet, according to Massey and Sánchez,
those who have more resources and power “are prone to undertake boundary work
to define one or more out-groups and then frame them as lacking basic human
attributes of warmth and competence, thus justifying their ongoing exploitation and
exclusion.”26
Today, there are close to twelve million undocumented immigrants who are
present in the United States without permission and, thus, who do not belong.27
Simply stating that they do not belong, however, ignores important nuances.
Immigration and economic policies and a labor market that has encouraged
migration from the south have facilitated the growth of the undocumented
immigrant population. The proliferation of the undocumented population was not
simply the result of migrants deciding to cross the border unlawfully, but also
involved complicated economic and political factors, as well as contradictory
immigration policies, which have simultaneously encouraged and restricted
migration.28
As a practical matter, the existence of a large undocumented population means
that there are approximately twelve million people who are both included and
excluded within American society.29 They are included in the sense that they are
actively participating in society—in the workforce, in schools, and in
communities.30 At the same time, they are excluded.31 They cannot obtain drivers’

25. There are many theories of assimilation and acculturation that are beyond the scope
of this Article. Generally, however, it is important to note that the concept of assimilation
has various meanings. Classical or straight-line assimilation argued that immigrants, after
arrival, go through three basic stages: acculturation—adopting the language and values of
the new country; structural assimilation—immigrants and their children develop personal
networks with natives; and marital assimilation—the descendants of immigrants intermarry
with natives of the new country. Id. at 2. Contrary to this assimilation theory, in the 1990s
social scientists began to acknowledge that assimilation was not always such a smooth,
linear process for immigrant groups. From this research emerged the theory of segmented
assimilation. Under segmented assimilation an immigrant group’s assimilation may move
upward or downward depending upon many factors, including, but not limited to, race,
ethnicity, legal status, level of education, and whether a group speaks English. See id. at 5–6.
26. Id. at 14.
27. Julia Preston, Illegal Immigrants Number 11.5 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2012,
at A14.
28. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND
MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 1–3 (2002).
29. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955 (describing the
undocumented immigrant as both an insider and outsider).
30. “DREAMers”—those who entered the United States before the age of sixteen and
who have lived in the United States continuously for at least five years—are the perfect
example of undocumented immigrants who are participating in society (having grown up
exclusively in the United States) but who are excluded because of their undocumented status.
Though the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) provides temporary status for
undocumented youth, it does not create a pathway to lawful permanent status or citizenship.
For information about Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, see Consideration of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
www.uscis.gov/childhoodarrivals (last updated July 2, 2013).
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licenses, work without authorization, or access most public benefits. And, of
course, they cannot join the political community.
Once here, however, their ties to the United States grow stronger. Most
noticeably, if an undocumented immigrant has a child that is born in the
United States, that child automatically becomes a U.S. citizen.32 As of 2008, there
were 5.5 million children living in the United States with at least one
undocumented parent.33 Of those children, seventy-three percent were U.S.
citizens.34 This presents a difficult situation—while U.S.-citizen children who have
undocumented parents are entitled to certain benefits because of their citizenship
status, their parents, who make decisions on their behalf, do not have equal status
and are not entitled to the same benefits.
The federal government has addressed unlawful migration by securing the
border,35 increasing deportations,36 and developing harsh immigration laws and
policies that transform traditionally civil immigration violations into criminal
offenses.37 Additionally, States have attempted to enforce immigration laws
through the passage of anti-immigrant legislation, some of which make
immigration-related offenses criminal.38
31. See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF
MODERN AMERICA 2 (2004) (“Marginalized by their position in the lower strata of the
workforce and even more so by their exclusion from the polity, illegal aliens might be
understood as a caste, unambiguously situated outside the boundaries of formal membership
and social legitimacy.”).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.”).
33. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., A PORTRAIT OF
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (2009), pewhispanic.org/files/reports
/107.pdf.
34. See id.
35. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BORDER PATROL
AGENT STAFFING BY FISCAL YEAR (2012), http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border
_security/border_patrol/usbp_statistics/usbp_fy12_stats/staffing_1993_2012.ctt/staffing_199
3_2012.pdf (noting that there were over 21,000 agents tasked with securing the border);
César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Cluster Introduction—Immigrant Outsider, Alien
Invader: Immigration Policing Today, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 231, 231–33 (2012) (arguing that
the reach of immigration policing is motivated by fear and racism).
36. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE
TOTAL REMOVALS (2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ero
more-removals1.pdf (showing that total removals in 2007 were 291,060, but as of August
2012 they had already reached 366,292).
37. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power,
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 371 (2006) (“Deportation became the consequence of almost any
criminal conviction of a noncitizen, including legal permanent residents. Immigrants who
had previously been subject only to civil immigration proceedings, including tourists and
business travelers who had overstayed their visas and students working beyond allotted
hours or in unauthorized employment, were newly subject to criminal sanctions in addition
to removal.”).
38. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-7 to -35 (2011) (various measures ranging from
access to public benefits to employer verification of immigration status); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-1509(A) (Supp. 2012) (criminal sanction for failing to carry documentation
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The increased criminalization of immigrants fosters negative stereotypes about
them—stereotypes that not only relate to their immigration status but also to their
personhood.39 For instance, an undocumented immigrant is not simply perceived as
having violated immigration laws, but is also, as legal scholar David Thronson
suggests, part of a “societal narrative that constructs an expanding notion of
unworthiness and ‘illegality.’”40 As expressed by one resident in Tulsa when
explaining his frustrations with undocumented immigrants, “[y]ou come in
illegally; everything you do from that point on is illegal.”41 Because Latino
immigrants constitute about half of the immigrants who have come to the
United States since 196542 and comprise the largest group of undocumented
immigrants,43 negative views about undocumented immigrants usually coexist with
views about Latinos.44
Tensions around identity also exist in the family law context. Because the family
is where language, culture, and values are transmitted,45 it is, in essence, where

demonstrating lawful immigration status), invalidated by Arizona v. United States, 132 S.
Ct. 2492, 2503 (2012); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-6A-10 (2012) (establishing a grant or incentive
program to local law enforcement agencies to enter into a 287(g) agreement with the
Department of Homeland Security); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-750 (Supp. 2012) (making it a
misdemeanor if someone eighteen or older fails to carry documentation demonstrating
lawful immigration status), invalidated by United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518,
532 (4th Cir. 2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1001 (LexisNexis 2012).
39. Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim Crow and AntiImmigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 177 (2010).
40. David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining the Experiences of
Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 45, 54–55
(2005).
41. Kari Huus, Turmoil in Tulsa: The Illegal Immigration Wreck, NBCNEWS.COM (July
17, 2007, 7:31 PM), http://www.today.com/id/19466978/ns/today-today_news/t/turmoil
-tulsa-illegal-immigration-wreck/#.UfcwZhaPDG4.
42. PEW HISPANIC CTR., A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS: A PORTRAIT OF THE 40 MILLION,
INCLUDING 11 MILLION UNAUTHORIZED 2 (2013), available at pewhispanic.org/files/2013/01
/statistical_portrait_final_jan_29.pdf.
43. JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 11 (2011)
http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf (noting that Mexicans comprised 58% of
the unauthorized population and that immigrants from other parts of Latin America
comprised 23% of unauthorized immigrants).
44. See MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 79 (“With 12 million people out of status
and temporary worker migration now pushing toward 400,000 per year and constituting the
bulk of new entrants, the share of migrants who lack full legal rights in the United States has
never been greater. Undocumented migrants alone now constitute one-third of all immigrants
in the United States, but . . . the share is much greater among Latin Americans. The large
share of respondents in our sample who lack documents (62%) thus reflects a fundamental
facet of contemporary Latino immigration to the United States. Latin Americans living in the
United States are probably more vulnerable and exploitable than at any point in American
history.”).
45. Annette R. Appell, “Bad” Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 NEV. L.J.
759, 759 (2007) (explaining that the lack of discussion about child welfare in civil rights and
critical race studies “is surprising given that children are both primary receivers and
transmitters of race, ethnicity, culture, language, and values; and that the constitutional civil
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identity is cultivated. Since child raising norms are often viewed through the lens of
one’s class, race, and ethnic culture, tensions arise when members of a dominant
group make childrearing assessments about parents who are members of a less
powerful, subordinate group. Dominant groups may justify removal of children
from parents whose identity is perceived as bad or harmful by arguing that it is in
the child’s best interests.46 Such actions, however, allow members of a dominant
group to instill in children their preferred culture, language, class, and values. The
effect of these actions cannot be minimized. As Professor Annette Appell argued,
when parents lose the ability to transmit these social goods, it “can compromise
individual, cultural, and even political identity.”47
Two historical child welfare practices support this assertion.48 “Child-saving”
agencies in the 1880s sought to save poor children of Irish, Polish, and Italian

rights to family autonomy—the parental rights so often denigrated—recognize the
importance of children in the creation and perpetuation of moral values and, ultimately, to a
diverse and critical polity”).
46. The state also constructs abandonment through detention and deportation. See, e.g.,
In re B & J, 756 N.W.2d 234, 237–38 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (undocumented parents who
were investigated for child abuse were reported to ICE by state child welfare authorities).
Though the allegations of abuse were later found to be unsubstantiated, the parents’
separation from their children because of their deportation led the family court to find that
the parents had abandoned their children and, therefore, their parental rights should be
terminated. Id.
47. Appell, supra note 45, at 760 (“Women who are compliant, English-speaking, not
ethnically diverse, White, and middle class are most successful in the child welfare system;
those who diverge from these norms are most likely to lose their motherhood. When mothers
lose their children, they lose their chance to pass on their language, culture, and values, and
their children lose their chance to receive these social goods. This loss can compromise
individual, cultural, and even political identity.”).
48. The historical practice of taking children from parents who were viewed as inferior
was not limited to the United States. For instance, in Spain, under the Franco regime, it is
now estimated that from 1939 to 1950 up to 30,000 children were taken from their mothers
after their mothers had been imprisoned for being leftist. A psychiatrist who is claimed to
have orchestrated these abductions stated, “[T]hose women had inside the seed of Marxism,
and if those children remained with their mothers, the Marxism [would] grow in those
children.” Sylvia Poggioli, Families of Spain’s ‘Stolen Babies’ Seek Answers—And
Reunions, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 14, 2012, 3:18 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/12
/14/167053609/families-of-spains-stolen-babies-seek-answers-and-reunions. The process
continued after Franco’s death and lasted through the 1980s. In later years babies were taken
from poor mothers and given to affluent, conservative, and devout Catholic families. Id.
Additionally, between 1910 and 1975 white Australians removed 100,000 children
from aboriginal women. Light-skinned children were given to white couples for adoption,
and dark-skinned children were sent to orphanages. LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA
ORPHAN ABDUCTION 310 (1999).
From 1920 to 1972 the Swiss government removed Roma children from their
parents and sent them to be raised by non-Roma families. Mary Ellen Tsekos, Minority
Rights: The Failure of International Law to Protect the Roma, 9 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 26, 26
(2002), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/09/3tsekos.pdf; see also GORDON,
supra, at 310.
Though some claim it to be a conspiracy theory, others believe that in the late 1940s,
with the assistance of doctors in Israel, Ashkenazi Jewish women stole babies, who had been

652

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:643

immigrants, who were classified as nonwhite on the East Coast, by sending them
on orphan trains from the East Coast to be raised by families who could “raise him
far above the class from which he sprang.”49
Similarly, in the 1800s—at a time when Native Americans were still denied
American citizenship—Christian missionaries, and later the federal government,
forcibly removed Native American children from their homes and placed them in
boarding schools.50 “[T]he aim was the assimilation of Indian children into AngloAmerican society.”51 According to Tsianina Lomawaima, a professor specializing
in American Indian Studies, the government’s intention behind establishing these
boarding schools was to “erase and replace” Native American culture.52 Native
American language, dress, and cultural practices were not allowed in the boarding
schools.53 Families were discouraged from visiting their children or even knowing
their location.54 These practices not only resulted in family destruction but also
caused children to become conflicted about their own racial and cultural
identities.55
Further, from 1958 to 1967, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the U.S. Children’s
Bureau, and the Child Welfare League of America developed the “Indian Adoption
Project,” whereby Native American children from western states were taken from
their biological parents and placed for adoption with non-Native American families
in the East and Midwest.56 This project came about as the result of ignorance,
cultural insensitivity, assimilationist goals, and racism.57
Like these historical child welfare practices that forcibly assimilated children
into the dominant culture, recent terminations of parental rights, as will be
described more fully in Part III, suggest similar tensions around identity and
struggles to cultivate a preferred “American” identity. If a U.S.-citizen child

born to Sephardic Yemeni Jewish mothers, from the hospital. The Sephardic Yemeni
mothers were informed that their children had died. GORDON, supra, at 310; see also Joel
Greenberg, The Babies from Yemen: An Enduring Mystery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, at A4.
49. GORDON, supra note 48, at 9–12. In her book, Gordon describes a slight twist to the
normal child-saving practices. A Catholic child-saving agency at the beginning of the
twentieth century attempted to place immigrant children, who on the East Coast were
considered nonwhite but who out west were considered white, with Mexican families in a
small southwestern mining town. Id. at 13–19. Anglos reacted by abducting the immigrant
children on the grounds that Mexicans—nonwhites—were unfit to raise white children. Id. at
65–79, 109–117.
50. THE HARVARD PROJECT ON AM. INDIAN ECON. DEV., THE STATE OF THE NATIVE
NATIONS: CONDITIONS UNDER U.S. POLICIES OF SELF-DETERMINATION 199–202, 236 (2008)
[hereinafter THE HARVARD PROJECT].
51. Id. at 199.
52. Charla Bear, American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt Many, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(May 12, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=16516865.
53. Marsha King, Tribes Confront Painful Legacy of Indian Boarding Schools, THE
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 3, 2008, 12:00 AM), http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews
/2004161238_boardingschool03m.html.
54. THE HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 50, at 236.
55. King, supra note 53.
56. THE HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 50, at 237.
57. Id.
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follows her mother after her mother’s deportation, she will be raised outside of the
United States—likely in a poorer country compared to the United States—by a
mother who is not an American citizen and who may not speak English. Her
mother cannot instill in her American values, and some argue that the United States
may view this as a threat to American democracy.58 Even if a child is not a U.S.
citizen, a juvenile court may still feel compelled to terminate parental rights,
believing that the child could be brought into “full citizenship” if raised in the
United States by American parents.59
Political scientist Samuel Huntington warned in his article, The Hispanic
Challenge, that because Mexican Americans no longer see themselves as the
minority that has to accommodate the dominant group and instead are committed to
their own culture and identity, they pose a threat to American democracy.60
Huntington argued that “American identity” has been defined by culture and
creed—a creed that derives from the Anglo-Protestant culture. Huntington further
stated:
Key elements of that culture include the English language; Christianity;
religious commitment; English concepts of the rule of law, including
the responsibility of rulers and the rights of individuals; and dissenting
Protestant values of individualism, the work ethic, and the belief that
humans have the ability and the duty to try to create a heaven on earth,
a ‘city on a hill.’61
According to Huntington, this national identity has been threatened by many
factors, including, but not limited to, individual identities that are based on race,
ethnicity, and gender. He claimed that the growth of the Latino population
threatened the values and identity of Anglo-Protestants and the “cultural and
political integrity” of the nation62 and that the burden to assimilate and adopt the
culture and values of the United States rests solely on the immigrant, a burden he

58. See Marcia Zug, Should I Stay or Should I Go: Why Immigrant Reunification
Decisions Should Be Based on the Best Interest of the Child, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1139, 1147–
52 (arguing that it is in the interest of the State to teach American children “the fundamental
values of a democratic society” and to keep “children connected to America” and that this
justifies the State’s interest in not reunifying children with parents following the parents’
deportation).
59. See GORDON, supra note 48, at 293–94 (describing how the adoption of the
immigrant children from the Foundling hospital, “would bring the children into a full
citizenship, unqualified by their parents’ economic or moral failings”).
60. Samuel P. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar.–Apr. 2004, at
30, 44–45, available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2004/03/01/the_hispanic
_challenge. But see Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural
Nation: The Challenge of Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1389
(2005) (critiquing Samuel Huntington’s book, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s
National Identity, and arguing that a “multiracial, multicultural nation may necessitate a
more diffuse national identity,” differing from Huntington’s assertion that immigrants must
assimilate into the Anglo-Protestant identity).
61. Huntington, supra note 60, at 31–32.
62. Id. at 32–33.
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claims Hispanics have not met.63 He concluded his piece by stating, “There is no
Americano dream. There is only the American dream created by an
Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican Americans will share in that dream and in that
society only if they dream in English.”64 His view is not simply an ivory tower one.
In 2006 forty-eight percent of Americans believed that “newcomers from other
countries threaten traditional American values and customs.”65
One way to maintain an Anglo-American identity is through children. Raising
children—even if they are children of immigrants—in an English-speaking
environment by Anglo parents preserves the Anglo-American identity.66 This
assimilation of sorts is even more important when the children are U.S. citizens, but
their birth parents are not.
The intersection of immigration and family law is sorely underexplored, and the
literature addressing it has not examined the historical relationship between
immigration law and early child welfare practices and the tensions around identity
that have existed under both.67 Nor has the literature examined how each area can

63. Id. at 36–39.
64. Id. at 45.
65. MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 71. Jason Richwine, who now works for the
Heritage Foundation, who coauthored the Heritage Foundation’s study on immigration
reform, and who received his Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard, argued in his 2009
dissertation that because current immigrants lack “the average cognitive ability that natives
possess,” the United States should focus its immigration policies on admitting those with
high IQs. Jason Richwine, IQ and Immigration Policy 59 (May 1, 2009) (Dissertation, Harvard
University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc
/140239668/IQ-and-Immigration-Policy-Jason-Richwine. Further, Richwine argued that
Hispanics have lower IQs than whites, stating, “Finally, it is worth asking ‘how long is too
long?’ when it comes [sic] Hispanic assimilation. No one knows whether Hispanics will ever
reach IQ parity with whites, but the prediction that new Hispanic immigrants will have lowIQ children and grandchildren is difficult to argue against.” Id. at 66.
66. Cf. Juan F. Perea, Buscando América: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to
Protect Latinos, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1439 (2004) (arguing that in the educational
context “[l]anguage-based subordination” has been harmful to Latinos). Perea notes that
some of the techniques used in the educational context “can be characterized as assimilative
in nature—pressuring Spanish speakers to abandon their language and culture or to integrate
into Anglo society as an underclass. Some of the techniques are not assimilative, but rather
discriminatory—residential or educational segregation, or teacher prejudice against Spanishspeaking students. All of these techniques, intentionally or not, reflect and enforce a racist,
subordinating attitude toward Latino students.” Id. Just as in the educational system, the
family is also another arena where state-intervention can reflect—whether intentionally or
unintentionally—attempts at assimilation.
67. David Thronson’s significant pieces were the first to frame many of the issues that
arise when these two areas of law intersect. See generally David B. Thronson, Choiceless
Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6 NEV. L.J. 1165, 1167 (2006);
Thronson, supra note 40. In addition to David Thronson, a few other scholars have explored
this intersection. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Interests of the
Child Standard, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 97–101 (2006); Rabin, supra note 16; Sarah
Rogerson, Unintended and Unavoidable: The Failure to Protect Rule and Its Consequences
for Undocumented Parents and Their Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 580 (2012); Marcia
Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 63 (2012);
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be a forum for cultivating an American identity. This historical relationship is
important because it illuminates how negative perceptions toward certain
immigrant groups and Native Americans influenced Anglo assessments of their
child-rearing practices. Essentially, members of the dominant Anglo culture sought
to cultivate a preferred American identity by removing children from the care of
their parents. In this way, these children became a blank slate on which to craft an
identity, or through which to remove the threat of a competing, alternative
identity—in a manner that completely disregarded the family’s relationship and
what would later be established as a constitutional right of the parents to care for
their children and of the children to be cared for by their parents.68 This Article
connects these historical practices to contemporary court decisions that terminate
the parental rights of undocumented parents and suggests that these decisions may
have more to do with tensions around identity than the protection and welfare of
children. Moreover, as scholars such as Annette Appell and Dorothy Roberts have
demonstrated, parents who are outside the dominant cultural norms—poor, racial
minorities, outlaws—have consistently been more vulnerable to state intervention.69
Undocumented parents not only face deportation, but also, like other “out” or
subordinate groups, the loss of their parental rights. When parents lose the right to
raise their children, they also lose the ability to transmit their culture and values.
Part I illustrates how, historically, immigration and citizenship laws regulated
American identity by determining which group of immigrants could immigrate and
become citizens. It then explores how similar efforts to regulate identity were

Zug, supra note 58.
A few student notes have also examined the prevalence of termination of parental
rights involving undocumented parents. See generally, e.g., Vinita Andrapalliyal, Note, The
CPS Took My Baby Away: Threats to Immigrant Parental Rights and a Proposed Federal
Solution, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 173 (2013); Trang Bui, Note, Battle Scars from the Fight
Between Family Law and Immigration Law: Incarcerated Immigrant Parents and Missouri’s
Response, 81 UMKC L. REV. 183 (2012); C. Elizabeth Hall, Note, Where Are My
Children . . . and My Rights? Parental Rights Termination as a Consequence of Deportation,
60 DUKE L.J. 1459 (2011); Timothy E. Yahner, Note, Splitting the Baby: Immigration,
Family Law, and the Problem of the Single Deportable Parent, 45 AKRON L. REV. 769
(2012).
68. Cf., Appell, supra note 45, at 759 (“Children are an essential but often overlooked
bounty in the regulation of race, culture, and rights.”).
69. Id. at 759 (exploring the role that culture and language play when Spanish-speaking
mothers are subject to state intervention); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS
8–10 (2002) (discussing the disproportionately African American face of the child welfare
system); Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and
Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 585–87 (1997) (describing the
way in which the child welfare system focuses on punishing mothers who are outside the
dominant cultural norms rather than fostering familial reunification); Deseriee A. Kennedy,
Children, Parents & the State: The Construction of a New Family Ideology, 26 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 78, 95–96 (2011) (discussing how laws and policies relating to
incarcerated parents impede reunification); Janet L. Wallace & Lisa R. Pruitt, Judging
Parents, Judging Place: Poverty, Rurality and Termination of Parental Rights, 77 MO. L.
REV. 95, 112–13 (2012) [hereinafter Poverty, Rurality and Termination of Parental Rights]
(examining the way in which poor parents living in rural parts of the country are vulnerable
to termination of parental rights).
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present in the child welfare context. The purpose of this Part is to suggest that
historical tensions around identity and exclusion present in both immigration and
child welfare law often mirrored one another. In other words, hostility toward a
particular immigrant group and rejection of its culture and values not only informed
and influenced immigration policies but also affected the manner in which their
families were treated.
Part II explores the ways in which harsh immigration policies and antiimmigrant sentiment contribute to public perceptions that associate Latino
immigrants with criminality, cultural deviance, and overarching illegality. This
background is important for understanding how anti-immigrant biases and hostile
perceptions toward certain immigrant groups may creep into and undermine child
welfare proceedings.
Part III details the constitutional rights that undocumented parents possess and
illustrates how anti-immigrant animus can threaten the fundamental rights of
undocumented parents in the family law context. It highlights cases in which the
parental rights of undocumented Latino parents were terminated, and explores the
subtle and not so subtle ways in which the identity of the parent was perceived by
decision-makers to be inferior. Concerns about criminality, as well as a belief that
Latino immigrants threaten the Anglo-American identity, can result in the loss of
legal rights for undocumented immigrants: specifically, the right of a parent to raise
her child and to develop the child’s identity and culture.
Part IV responds to one scholar’s proposal to change the standard used in
termination proceedings when such proceedings involve undocumented parents of
U.S.-citizen children. This Part argues against this approach because it would
undermine the constitutional rights of undocumented parents and devalue their
family relationships.
I. IMMIGRATION AND FAMILY LAW: HISTORICAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF
EXCLUSION AND THE TENSIONS AROUND CULTIVATING A NATIONAL IDENTITY
This Part provides an overview of how immigration and citizenship laws
regulated national identity in the 1800s through the second half of the twentieth
century by determining who could enter the United States and who could become a
citizen. It also closely examines the influence of immigration policies and practices
on migration from Mexico, which continues to affect present day perceptions and
attitudes toward Latino immigrants. It then examines early child welfare practices
that removed immigrant and Native American children from their homes because
Anglos perceived the identity of the children’s parents—their race, culture,
language, class, and values—to be inferior and un-American.
This Part’s purpose is to parallel the ways in which tensions around identity and
its cultivation existed within both immigration law and child welfare practices.
More precisely, Part A explores the exclusion of Native Americans, Southern and
Eastern European immigrants, and Mexicans to provide a framework for Part B,
which details the treatment of their families. Combined, this Part illustrates how
both forums excluded these groups because their culture, race, and values did not
align with that of the dominant culture—Anglo-Saxon Northern European.
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A. Cultivating an Anglo-American Identity Under Immigration and Citizenship Law
Immigration and citizenship law define who may enter the United States and
who may join the political community as a U.S. citizen. The history of immigration
and citizenship law reveals that race and culture—combined with economic and
political conditions—influenced who was permitted to enter and remain in the
United States and who was entitled to U.S. citizenship. These laws affected not
only immigrants but also Native Americans, who were restricted from citizenship
until nearly the second half of the twentieth century.70 Ultimately, immigrants
whose identities more closely aligned with those of Anglo-Protestants were treated
more favorably under immigration and citizenship law.71
1. Immigration and Citizenship Laws and the Exclusion of Native Americans and
Southern and Eastern European Immigrants
As legal scholars such as Ian Haney López and historian Mae Ngai
demonstrated in their books,72 our nation’s immigration and citizenship laws have
used race as a basis for restricting who could immigrate to the United States and
who could become a citizen. These legislative efforts sought to cultivate an AngloAmerican identity within the United States through the law.
The original qualification for naturalization was premised on race, and whether a
group was racially eligible for citizenship often depended upon how well it could
culturally assimilate into Anglo-Protestant society.73 After the Civil Rights Act

70. See Nationality Act of 1940 § 201(b), Pub. L. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138
(providing that “[a] person born in the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo,
Aleutian, or other aboriginal tribe” is a national and citizen of the United States).
71. See NGAI, supra note 31, at 23 (noting that the 1924 quota law “served
contemporary prejudices among white Protestant Americans from northern European
backgrounds and their desire to maintain social and political dominance. Those prejudices
had informed the restrictionist movement since the late nineteenth century. But the nativism
that impelled the passage of the act of 1924 articulated a new kind of thinking, in which the
cultural nationalism of the late nineteenth century had transformed into a nationalism based
on race.”). See generally IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE (1996) (examining early cases and immigration and naturalization laws to explore the
legal and social construction of race in America).
72. See LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 37 (“Federal law restricted immigration to this country
on the basis of race for nearly one hundred years, roughly from the Chinese exclusion laws
of the 1880s until the end of the national origin quotas in 1965.”); NGAI, supra note 31, at
23. López later explains that birthright citizenship was tied to race until 1940 and naturalized
citizenship until 1952. LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 39.
73. See United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 215 (1923) (“The children of English,
French, German, Italian, Scandinavian, and other European parentage, quickly merge into
the mass of our population and lose the distinctive hallmarks of their European origin. On
the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the children born in this country of Hindu parents
would retain indefinitely the clear evidence of their ancestry. It is very far from our thought
to suggest the slightest question of racial superiority or inferiority. What we suggest is
merely racial difference, and it is of such character and extent that the great body of our
people instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of assimilation.”); LÓPEZ, supra
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declared that all persons born in the United States (except for “Indians not taxed”)
were citizens, regardless of race, color, or slavery,74 Congress allowed persons “of
African nativity” or “African descent” to naturalize.75 It did not remove the
requirement that a person be white because of concerns about extending citizenship
to Native Americans and Asians.76 One senator, in explaining his opposition to
extending citizenship to Native Americans, referred to “the rank, privileges, and
immunities of citizenship upon the cruel savages who destroyed [Minnesota’s]
peaceful settlements and massacred the people with circumstances of atrocity too
horrible to relate.”77 Another senator questioned “whether this door [of citizenship]
shall now be thrown open to the Asiatic population,” which would result in “an end
to republican government there [on the Pacific Coast], because it is very well
ascertained that those people have no appreciation of that form of government; it
seems to be obnoxious to their very nature; they seem to be incapable either of
understanding or carrying it out.”78
Jus soli—the acquisition of citizenship at birth—did not apply to Native
Americans. In 1884 the Court held that Native American children did not acquire
citizenship at birth because they owed allegiance to their tribe and not to the United
States.79 Though the Supreme Court in 1898 held that children of parents racially
ineligible to naturalize could acquire citizenship at birth,80 this did not include
Native American children. In 1924 Congress passed the Indian Citizenship Act,
which granted citizenship to Native Americans born in the United States, though it
was uncertain whether those born after the Act’s enactment were conferred
citizenship.81 It was not until 1940 that all Native Americans who were born in the
United States were considered citizens.82
Racial restrictions on immigration persisted into the twentieth century. Intense
nativism resulted in the passage of a temporary quota system in 1921,83 which was
made permanent in 1924.84 This system intentionally discriminated against
immigrants from eastern and southern Europe who had been arriving in large
numbers in the early 1900s and who were considered racially and culturally
note 67, at 79–80 (discussing United States v. Thind and another Supreme Court decision,
Ozawa v. United States, and explaining that the Court in both cases “abandoned scientific
explanations of race in favor of those rooted in common knowledge when science failed to
reinforce popular beliefs about racial differences”).
74. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. For a discussion of early citizenship
laws, see LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 37–47.
75. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256.
76. LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 43.
77. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2939 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Hendricks)).
78. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2939 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Cowan)).
79. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 94 (1884).
80. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).
81. Act of June 2, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253; LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 41
(“[Q]uestions arose regarding the citizenship of those born in the United States after the
effective date of the 1924 act.”).
82. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 201(b), 54 Stat. 1137, 1138.
83. Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat. 5.
84. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, 43 Stat. 153, 159.
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undesirable.85 The system placed annual quotas on the number of immigrants
admitted from a particular country, with the quotas based on the 1890 census.86
Because Northern Europeans constituted the largest group in the 1890 census, it
received the largest quota.87 In passing this system, Congress acknowledged that it
wanted “to confine immigration as much as possible to western and northern
European stock”88 and expressed fears that non-Protestant cultures endangered
American values.89 For example, the chairman of the immigration committee of the

85. See LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 38; Johnson, supra note 21, at 1127–31(describing how
the animosity toward southern and eastern Europeans led to the passage of the quota
system); cf. RODOLFO F. ACUÑA, OCCUPIED AMERICA: A HISTORY OF CHICANOS 185 (Robert
Miller & Lauren G. Shafer eds., 3d ed. 1988) (describing how some leaders in Congress
wanted a quota that would limit Mexican migration but others worried that doing so would
anger agribusiness, which relied upon Mexican labor and would block the bill’s passage).
Though the Immigration and Naturalization Committee tried to appease the opponents by
promising that another bill would be presented that would create border patrol and would
limit Mexican migration, the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee stated that
the 1924 Act, which would make the quota system permanent, “opens the doors for perhaps
the worst element that comes into the United States—the Mexican peon . . . [It] opens the
door wide and unrestricted to the most undesirable people who come under the flag.”
ACUÑA, supra, at 186.
86. Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159; see also
NGAI, supra note 31, at 25 (explaining how the law required the allocation of quotas to
countries in the same proportion in which Americans traced their origins to those countries).
Ngai further explains that the problem with developing this system was that national origins
data regarding immigrants was not recorded until 1899. NGAI, supra note 31, at 25.
Therefore, the newly established quota board had to create the categories that would make
up the national origins quota system—that is, “national origin,” “native stock,”
“nationality”—and also the definitions for these categories. Id. at 25–26. As an example of
the imprecise and, arguably racist, nature of these categories, “nationality” was defined as
country of birth, but the law provided that individuals who lived in the United States in 1920
did not include “(1) immigrants from the [Western Hemisphere] or their descendants, (2)
aliens ineligible for citizenship or their descendants, (3) the descendants of slave immigrants,
or (4) the descendants of the American aborigines.” Id. at 26 (quoting Immigration Act of
1924, Pub. L. No. 68-139, § 11(d), 43 Stat. 153, 159). Ngai argued that the system
“proceeded from the conviction that the American nation was, and should remain, a white
nation descended from Europe.” Id. at 27. She also noted, “[W]hile the national origins quota
system intended principally to restrict immigration from southern and eastern Europe and
used the notion of national origins to justify discrimination against immigrants from those
nations, it did more than divide Europe. It also divided Europe from the non-European
world. It defined the world formally in terms of country and nationality but also in terms of
race. The quota system distinguished persons of the ‘colored races’ from ‘white’ persons
from ‘white’ countries.” Id.
87. See Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional
Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927, 1932–33 (1996) (describing the law and
explaining how it favored immigrants from northern and western Europe).
88. LÓPEZ, supra note 71, at 38 (citing Act of May 19, 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, 42 Stat.
5).
89. See DANIELS, supra note 21, at 49 (noting that the impetus for the quota system was
“the beleaguered feeling of so many old-stock Protestant Americans. Immigrants and their
non-Protestant cultures, they felt, represented a serious and sustained challenge to American
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House of Representatives argued that the United States was in danger of being
overtaken by “abnormally twisted” and “unassimilable” Jews, “filthy, un-American
and often dangerous to their habits.”90
2. Mexican Migration and the Emergence of a Latino Identity Associated with
Criminality and Illegal Status
Mexican immigrants were also excluded under immigration laws, though in
different ways. In order to contextualize contemporary issues involving Latino
immigrants that will be discussed throughout this Article, a brief detour into the
complicated history of America’s immigration policies toward Mexico is
necessary.
Mexicans were not racially restricted from naturalization. In 1897 a district
court in Texas held that though a thirty-seven-year-old Mexican man, Ricardo
Rodriguez, was not “white,” citizenship could be conferred to him and other
Mexicans because of rights established by treaties between the United States and
Mexico.91 While this holding may belie a claim that immigration and citizenship
laws discriminated against Mexicans, the following section will explore the ways in
which “[t]heir legal whiteness was contingent and unstable[.]”92
The border between the United States and Mexico was created in 1848 through
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Mexico had surrendered California, Arizona,
New Mexico, Texas, and parts of Colorado, Nevada, and Utah.93 Around this time,
Mexicans provided labor in the southwestern United States in mines, farms, and
railroads.94
Despite the unrestricted flow of labor from Mexico to the United States, tensions
between Mexicans and Anglos were prevalent in the Southwest.95 Historian Linda
Gordon described the racial relationship between Mexicans and Anglos in a small
southwestern mining town as “immigrant” and “American”—irrespective of the
legal citizenship of Mexicans.96 Another historian noted, “Casting Mexicans as
foreign distanced them both from Euro-Americans culturally and from the
Southwest as a spatial referent: it stripped Mexicans of the claim of belonging that
they had had as natives, even as conquered natives.”97 For Mexicans, citizenship—
whether by birth or through naturalization—was not beneficial because regardless
of their citizenship status, Anglos viewed them as foreigners.98
In the late 1800s, lynching of Mexicans was so common that southwesterners
came to believe that white men received trials while Mexicans were hanged.99 In

values.”).
90. Id. 47–48.
91. In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 337, 350–51, 355 (W.D. Tex. 1897); NGAI, supra note
31, at 53–54.
92. NGAI, supra note 31, at 54.
93. MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 24–26.
94. NGAI, supra note 31, at 129.
95. See GORDON, supra note 48, at 24.
96. Id. at 312.
97. NGAI, supra note 31, at 133 (emphasis in original).
98. Id. at 132.
99. GORDON, supra note 48, at 268.
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1873 in Tucson, where Mexicans still maintained greater power compared to other
locations in the United States, individuals protesting the hanging of white men
accused of murder stated, “You can hang a Mexican, and you can hang a Jew, and
you can hang a nigger, but you can’t hang an American citizen.”100 In one Arizona
county, over the course of a decade in the late 1800s, there were a total of five legal
hangings—one Native American, one black man, and three Mexicans.101
These racial tensions did not curb demand for Mexican labor in the United
States.102 In the early 1900s, U.S. employers relied on private labor contractors to
recruit Mexican workers. These contractors or recruiters were paid for each worker
that they obtained. Their practices were called “el enganche,” meaning “the hook”
or “indentured.”103 The recruiters advanced Mexican laborers money to travel to the
United States.104 Once the laborers had arrived, they soon discovered that they were
indenturedlow wages, poor working conditions, and high interest rates had been
placed on their loans.105
While the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 imposed a head tax and
literacy test on arriving immigrants,106 the attorney general exempted Mexicans.107
Even though the Act was intended to restrict immigration, the government
excluded Mexicans because of the reliance on Mexican labor within the United
States.108
Though the 1924 quota system did not apply to immigrants from the Western
Hemisphere, the formation of Border Patrol that same year, as well as other
immigration restrictions that were included in the 1924 law, led to a new focus on
deportation and immigration enforcement, which dramatically increased
deportations.109 For instance, in 1920 there were 2762 deportations and nine years
later there were 38,796.110 Border Patrol focused its efforts more aggressively on
the Mexican border than the Canadian, with Mexicans emerging as “iconic illegal
aliens.”111 Historian Mae Ngai notes:
It was ironic that Mexicans became so associated with illegal
immigration because, unlike Europeans, they were not subject to
numerical quotas and, unlike Asiatics, they were not excluded as
racially ineligible to citizenship. But as numerical restriction assumed
primacy in immigration policy, its enforcement aspectsinspection
procedures, deportation, the Border Patrol, criminal prosecution, and

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 2728.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 2728.
Id. at 28.
Immigration Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 301, 39 Stat. 874.
MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 29.
Id.
See NGAI, supra note 31, at 6475.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 58.
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irregular categories of immigrationcreated many thousands of illegal
Mexican immigrants.112
Yet even during this period of enforcement, immigration policies vacillated
between encouraging more migration from Mexico and carrying out mass
deportations of Mexicans.113 For example, Mexican laborers were relied upon
during World War I, but after the stock market crash of 1929, the government
initiated a deportation campaign that removed 458,000 Mexicans between 1929 and
1937.114 Instead of providing benefits during the Depression, local relief agencies
reported Mexicans, including citizens and lawful permanent residents, to
immigration authorities so that they would be deported.115 Estimates indicate that
sixty percent of those repatriated during this period were either children or
American citizens by birth.116 During the 1930s, the size of the Mexican population
in the United States was reduced by forty-one percent.117
Immigration policy would shift once again. In the late 1930s, agricultural
growers claimed a labor shortage, even though the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) argued that one did not exist, and the director of the Texas Works
Progress Administration stated that labor existed when “reasonable wages” were
paid.118 Nonetheless, with pressure from members of Congress from southwestern
districts, the U.S. Employment Service certified that six thousand contract laborers
should be imported.119 In 1942 President Roosevelt negotiated a treaty with Mexico
that brought Mexican farmworkers to the United States.120 Termed the “Bracero
Program,” it provided visas to Mexican workers.121
The Bracero Program, which ended in 1965, led to greater illegal migration, in
large part because there were more Mexicans who wanted to become braceros than
the Mexican government could accommodate.122 Those workers who arrived
outside of the program came to be referred to as “wetbacks” and some employers
preferred to hire them because they could pay them “wetback wages.”123
“Wetbacks” were associated with “misery, disease, crime and many other evils,”
but these stereotypes extended to all Mexicans.124 An immigration official noted
that “wetbacks” were “superficially indistinguishable from Mexicans legally in the
United States.”125
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Id. at 71.
MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 3334.
Id.
NGAI, supra note 31, at 71.
Id. at 72.
MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 34.
NGAI, supra note 31, at 13637.
Id. at 137.
MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 3441.
Id. at 35.
NGAI, supra note 31, at 148; MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 41.
NGAI, supra note 31, at 148–49.
Id. at 149.
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With the recession that followed the Korean War, and in response to those
concerned about unlawful migration, in 1954 the former INS instituted
“Operation Wetback.”126 It militarized the border and deported undocumented
migrants.127 At the same time, to appease agricultural growers who relied upon
Mexican laborers, it increased the number of bracero visas available.
At one point the INS was raiding agricultural fields in the southwestern
United States, arresting undocumented workers, transporting them back
to the border, and deporting them into the waiting arms of officials
from the U.S. Department of Labor, who promptly processed them as
braceros and retransported them back to the very fields where they had
been arrested in the first place!128
The Bracero Program ended in 1964,129 and a year later, Congress abandoned
the visa quota system.130 For the first time, however, Congress placed an annual cap
on migration from the entire Western Hemisphere because of fears of unrestricted
Latin American migration.131 In 1976 Congress extended the 20,000
migrant-per-country limit, which had previously applied only to the Eastern
Hemisphere, to the Western Hemisphere, and also subjected the Western
Hemisphere to the preference system.132
Because quotas had never before applied to the Western Hemisphere, the
avenues for Latinos to migrate legally to the United States became limited. To
illustrate this point, from 1960 to 1980 the number of migrants who came to the

126. MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 37–41.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 37 (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 41.
130. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006)) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act).
Under the new system, Congress allocated a quota of up to 20,000 visas annually for
countries in the Eastern Hemisphere (Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and the Pacific),
and the Hemisphere received a total annual cap of 170,000 visas. § 2, 79 Stat. at 911–12
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (2006)). The family-based and employmentbased preference system that exists today was developed. § 1, 79 Stat. at 911 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (2006)).
131. § 21(e), 79 Stat. at 921 (codified as amended 8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2006)); see also H.R.
Rep. No. 89-745, at 48 (1965) (stating that “[t]he most compelling reason for placing a
numerical ceiling upon immigration from the Western Hemisphere relates to the worldwide
population explosion and the possibility of a sharp increase in immigration from Western
Hemisphere countries”); S. Rep. No. 89-748, at 17 (1965) (further providing that “[t]he
committee has become increasingly concerned with the unrestricted flow of immigration
from the nonquota countries”); HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST
STORY OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 134 (2006); Johnson, supra
note 21, at 1132 (discussing the racial implications of the quota system).
132. See Immigration Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 2, 79 Stat. 911, 911–12
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2006)); see also MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at
43 (describing the economic and political conditions in the United States that made
immigration a political issue and led to further restrictions on migration from the Western
Hemisphere).
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United States annually from Mexico did not change, but illegal entry became much
more common because legal avenues had been closed off.133 At the same time,
industries continued to recruit and employ undocumented labor. “During the
twenty-one-year history of mass undocumented migration, the United States, in
effect, operated a de facto guest-worker program.”134 Border enforcement
symbolically reassured a public concerned about illegal migration, but the flow of
workers to fill jobs in the United States continued.135
In 1986 Congress attempted to reform the immigration system through the
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).136 IRCA did two main things: it
legalized those who were unlawfully present and had arrived prior to 1982, and it
created provisions that would sanction employers who knowingly hired
undocumented workers.137 Though Congress sought to curb future unlawful
migration by deterring employers from hiring undocumented workers, it did not
stop employers from doing so.138
The continued growth of the undocumented population and public resentment
toward undocumented immigrants in the second half of the twentieth century led to
harsh immigration policies that were justified based on undesirable attributes
associated with Latino immigrants.139 In reviewing comments by legislators
recorded in the Congressional Record from 1994 to 1996, Lina Newton stated:
The language officials employed to justify [the legislation] combined
the contemporary ideology of balanced budget conservatism and the
divisions forged between deserving and undeserving members with
ascriptive traditions that linked Mexicans to undesirable attributes. Not
only did deviant constructions of the unauthorized correspond with
punitive policy measures, but these constructions also accentuated a list
of qualities and behaviors that marked immigrants more broadly as
unworthy of consideration for social membership. The immigrant
family was portrayed as another invasion of the nation, as individuals
brought their unproductive dependents into the nation: pregnant wives,
children, and elder family members would end up on welfare or take up
space in schools, hospitals, and communities.140
In 1996 Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA),141 the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act

133. MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 73.
134. MASSEY ET AL., supra note 28, at 45.
135. Id. at 45–47.
136. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)).
137. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).
138. After the passage of IRCA, immigrants began using fake documents, often with the
assistance of employers, and employers hired subcontractors to shield their own liability. See
MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 96.
139. See id. at 68–71.
140. Id. at 69–70 (quoting LINA NEWTON, ILLEGAL ALIEN, OR IMMIGRANT: THE POLITICS
OF IMMIGRATION REFORM 164 (2008)).
141. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
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(PRWORA),142 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act (IIRIRA),143 arguably the most drastic and harsh changes made to our
U.S. immigration laws. Together, these laws increased border patrol, initiated
287(g) programs, expanded the crimes that would lead to deportation, restricted
undocumented immigrants from receiving public benefits, and required family
members sponsoring immigrants to provide affidavits of support demonstrating that
their household income was at least 125% above the poverty line.144
Today, one basis for a common identity among Latinos—likely because of
anti-immigrant sentiment that has fostered marginalization and exclusion—is
undocumented status. During a study conducted by Massey and Sánchez, in which
they interviewed 159 first- and second-generation immigrants of Caribbean,
Central American, Mexican, and South American origin145 and asked “what
accounted for the emergence of a common identity among Latin American
immigrants in the United States,”146 one Mexican man living in New York City
responded, “Well, maybe you see that we are illegal immigrants.”147 In a follow-up
question, the interviewer asked whether undocumented status was a basis for
identity and the man replied, “that is the identity.”148

Stat. 1214.
142. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
143. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
144. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 442, 110 Stat. at 1279–80
(allowing local law enforcement to arrest and detain illegal aliens); Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, §§ 102–104, 110 Stat. at 3009-554 to
556 (increasing border patrol); § 321, 110 Stat. at 3009-627 to -628 (expanding definition of
aggravated felonies for immigration purposes); § 236, 110 Stat. at 3009-585 to -587
(identification of criminal aliens); Subtitle C, 110 Stat. at 3009-635 to -641 (additional
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 2260–74 (see sections 401 to 412 limiting public
benefits to undocumented immigrants and section 423 providing the requirements for
sponsor’s affidavit of support).
145. MASSEY & SÁNCHEZ, supra note 19, at 181–212. As part of their study, Massey and
Sánchez interviewed immigrants of Caribbean, Mexican, Central American and South
American origin and asked them questions, which were intended to explore the ways in
which immigrants constructed their identity in the United States. Id. at 256. Based on the
answers respondents provided, the authors discovered that there had been an emergence of a
Latino identity that took form after immigrants arrived in the United States—an identity that
extended beyond a particular country. Id. at 183–84. Part of this Latino identity included
culture and language, but it also included the experience of exclusion and marginalization.
Id. On the other hand, close to two-thirds of respondents rejected an American identity. Id. at
203–21. The authors concluded that a “rejection of an American identity stems from the
exclusion and discrimination that immigrants experience the more time they spend in the
United States. Paradoxically, resistance to an American identity is something ‘made in the
USA’ through the accumulation of negative experience with U.S. people and institutions.”
Id. at 212.
146. Id. at 189.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis in original).
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B. The Cultivation of an Anglo National Identity Through Child Welfare Practices:
The Experiences of Early Immigrants and Native Americans
Tensions around national identity and how to cultivate that identity have,
historically, not only been the domain of immigration and citizenship law, but also
have been present in early child welfare practices. Just as certain groups were
excluded under immigration and citizenship law, their family relationships were
devalued as well. Measures taken to protect early immigrant and Native American
children—in the name of the best interests of the child—also reflected attempts at
forced assimilation. This Part describes the historical practices of removing
immigrant and Native American children from their parents.
1. Early Immigrants and Orphan Trains
Early child welfare practices elucidate the manner in which hostility toward
particular immigrant groups influenced assessments about their families. As noted
above, immigrants from eastern and southern Europe were the targets of antiimmigrant sentiment because their race, culture, and values were perceived to be
misaligned with Anglo-Protestants. These perceptions influenced the treatment of
their family relationships in the child welfare context as well.
The social construction of race in the late 1800s was slightly different than it is
today. Knowing the social construction, though, is helpful for understanding the
way in which race influenced child welfare practices. On the East Coast,
Anglo-Saxons of Northern European heritage constituted the “superior race.”149
Those who arrived from other countries were categorized as separate races—“the
Irish, Italians, Slavs, ‘Hebrew,’ or ‘Hindus,’ for example.”150 Elite Protestants, for
instance, described the Irish as wild, undisciplined, and primitive.151 That is not to
say that the Irish were categorized the same as African Americans. According to
Gordon, “These [race categories] were not physical or cultural descriptions of
innocuous ‘difference,’ but social and economic markings of rank.”152 Certain
groups, mostly those from Europe, eventually “worked their way into
whiteness.”153 The West Coast’s definition included other groups more quickly
compared with the East Coast, and part of the appeal of living out west was the
opportunity to be considered white.154 Nevertheless, even there, Mexicans remained
nonwhite.155
In 1853, Protestant minister Charles Loring Brace founded the Children’s Aid
Society and initiated what has been termed “orphan trains.”156 The Children’s Aid
Society placed orphans157 on trains and sent them to live with families in rural
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Id.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 104.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8–9.
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areas, usually out west.158 The parents who received these children viewed it as a
form of apprenticeship: children could provide needed labor, for instance, on the
farm.159 The children who were sent on orphan trains came from poor immigrant—
Irish, Italian, or Polish—families, and more than half of the children were being
raised by single mothers.160 By 1910, over 110,000 orphans had been placed with
other families.161 In support of his mission, Brace stated:
When placed in a farmer’s family, he grows up as one of their
number . . . The peculiar temptations to which he has been subject—
such, for instance, as stealing and vagrancy—are reduced to a
minimum; his self-respect is raised, and the chances of success held out
to a laborer in this country . . . soon raise him far above the class from
which he sprang.162
Agents—prosperous, white Protestants—who had come to be known as “child
savers” roamed the streets looking for street children and made minimal efforts to
locate their parents.163 “The child savers . . . imagined proper child raising in norms
specific to their class and ethnic culture, as we all do.”164 Poor parents referred to
these agents as “child stealers,” terrified that their children would be kidnapped.165
Parents were compelled to give up their children, and it would later be determined
that in about half of these cases, the removal was based on poverty alone.166
2. “A Conflict Between Americans and Half-Breed Mexican Indians”167
Around the same time period, Catholic charities in New York, whose leadership
was mostly Irish, defended their faith against the mission of the Children’s Aid
Society to send away orphans it deemed religiously and racially inferior, by
forming their own child-saving agencies.168 These Catholic agencies were less

to as orphans were actually turned over to institutions by single mothers who could not
afford to provide for them. Many others who were also labeled “orphans” were children who
had not been placed in institutions but who were living on the streets trying to earn money.
The largest group considered orphans was comprised of children who had been living with
single mothers. In fact, almost 55% of the neglect cases in New York City involved single
mothers, but only 10–15% of households in New York City at this time were headed by
single mothers. Id. at 7–8. According to Gordon, “The child neglect of which they were
accused was often difficult to distinguish from, simply, poverty: the children were
malnourished, poorly clad, without medical care, or living in unheated flats; they were left
unsupervised or with slightly older siblings while mothers worked.” Id. at 8.
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id. at 9–10.
160. Id. at 8–11.
161. Id. at 10.
162. Id. at 9 (omissions and alterations in original).
163. Id. at 10–11.
164. Id. at 10.
165. Id. at 10–11.
166. Id. at 11.
167. GORDON, supra note 48, at 294.
168. See id. at 12–13.
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concerned about racial classifications; instead, their main priority was to grow the
Catholic faith westward by placing immigrant orphans with Catholic families who
could transmit Catholic values.169
One child custody case unearthed by historian Linda Gordon involving orphans
who were placed out west by a New York City Catholic orphanage, the Foundling,
illustrates the social construction of race in the early 1900s and its effect on child
welfare practices. Further, in her examination of this particular child custody case,
Gordon explores the ways in which race, religion and ethnicity were and continue
to be “varying, fluid, and easily reshaped.”170
In 1904 the Foundling sent a group of immigrant orphans on a train to
Clifton-Morenci, a small mining town in Arizona.171 In looking for homes for the
orphans, the Foundling’s primary concern was placing the children with Catholic
families.172 Because most of the Catholic residents in the town were Mexican, a
local Catholic priest arranged for Mexican families to take in the orphans.173
Upon the arrival of the orphans, Anglo families in Clifton-Morenci learned that
these children (who were mostly Irish but were viewed as white) would be taken in
by Mexican families (who were viewed as nonwhite), which caused them to
become enraged.174 Because many of the Anglos did not practice any religion, they
found the transmission of Catholic values to be of little importance.175 “The
problem as the ladies began to construct it right there at the station was that the
lovely orphans were Anglos, not only elegantly dressed but also blond and
light-skinned, and most of the crowd at the station was Mexican.”176
Rather than following legal procedures, the Anglo families engaged in
vigilantism in the belief that something needed to be done immediately. Armed
men, along with a mob of approximately 400 (of a town of about 735 Anglo

169. Id. at 16, 17–18 (discussing a faction within the Catholic Church referred to as the
“American or assimilationist tendency”).
170. Id. at 302 (explaining that the child custody battle in Clifton-Morenci “was never an
either/or question, religion or race. To ask the question this way is to assume something
fixed and fundamental about prejudice and about categories such as religion, race, and
ethnicity, when they were in fact varying, fluid, and easily reshaped. Those who insisted that
religion was primary were either easterners whose interests lay in assimilating foreigners of
different racial ‘stock’ or Catholic leaders who knew that the Mexican flock was vital to
their religious empire.”).
171. See id. at 34–43.
172. See id. at 16–18.
173. Id. at 18.
174. See id. at 41–43, 72–79.
175. Id. at 71 (“Two of the groups were united by religion, two of the groups by ‘race.’
But they did not all recognize the alignments. The New Yorkers did not feel bound to the
Anglos by whiteness. The Anglos did not understand how the Catholics felt about preserving
the young souls for the faith. . . . To the Clifton Anglos, religion was not an issue; the
majority of them were not church-goers and, although most were Protestants, among their
number were some who were born Catholics and Jews. To the sisters religion remained the
overriding issue, although they would come to ‘see’ that white Catholics were better than
brown Catholics as they learned the Anglo racial system. And the Mexican women had not
yet learned how intensely Anglos felt about racial borders.”).
176. Id. at 42.
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adults), demanded that the children be turned over.177 The day after the children’s
arrival in Clifton-Morenci, Anglos summoned a judge to write up the adoption
papers.178 As Gordon described, “[t]hey were taking their first step toward ex post
facto legalization of their vigilantism.”179
The Anglo women’s motives for wanting the children were mixed, as some had
personal and self-interested reasons (like the Mexicans),180evidencing that they
were not simply motivated by charity or child saving. Some had fertility
problems.181 Others had adult children, but desired more children.182 According to
Gordon, however, “they not only wanted the babies, they were beginning to think it
wasn’t right for the Mexicans to take the babies, and it is hard to know—perhaps
even hard for them to know—which came first.”183
When the matter did reach the courts, Gordon described the trial as both
entertainment and political discourse.184 Not one Mexican person testified—or was
even present in the courtroom.185 “It was an Anglo courtroom in its personnel and
equally in its definitions of non-Anglo people.”186
Many of the white witnesses focused their testimony on “disparaging the
Mexicans’ standard of living and morality.”187 According to Anglos being Mexican
meant being “poor, ignorant, degraded.”188 Anglos referred to Mexicans as unclean,
even though some Mexican women cleaned the homes of Anglo families.189
One Anglo woman testified that the orphans were ill when she first saw them,
and she then described how they were throwing up “chili and beans and tortillas,
and watermelon, and Mexican beans” and that some of the children had a “very
strong odor of whiskey and beer.”190 Gordon noted that the vomiting, if true, would
not have been surprising “since the children may have just drunk Clifton water and
eaten beans for the first time. They may have had a version of ‘Montezuma’s
revenge.’ Everyone knew the water was terrible.”191
There were strong emotions in the courtroom, making it difficult to differentiate
between real emotion and strategy.192 Lawyers encouraged the Anglo parents to
display the children to the court so that those present could see that they were being

177. Id. at 111.
178. See id. at 208.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 67.
181. Id. at 72.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See id. at 275–306 (describing the trial that took place).
185. Id. at 276–77.
186. Id. at 277.
187. Id. at 291.
188. Id. at 122.
189. Id. at 202; see also ACUÑA, supra note 85, at 157 (describing how, around the same
time period, Mexicans were also prevented from attending Anglo-American schools, their
reasons including that Mexicans were poorly dressed, unclean, and immoral; they were not
white; and they were slower learners).
190. GORDON, supra note 48, at 203.
191. Id. at 204.
192. See id. at 278.
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well taken care of by Anglo families.193 According to one newspaper account, when
a father told his child (one of the orphans) to go to sleep, the child responded,
“Won’t you watch me so the Mexicans can’t get me?”194
The children, however, had lived with the Anglo parents for three-and-a-half
months, creating a conflict between how the children were taken and the
subsequent bonds that formed.195 “Arguments for the best interests of the child
could, in the extreme, benefit anyone who kidnapped a child and managed to evade
capture or legal action for an extended period of time.”196
Unsurprisingly, the court held that adoption by the Anglo families would be in
the best interests of the children.197 The judge’s opinion did not describe the
vigilantism that resulted in the children being kidnapped.198 Instead, he described
the mob as “committee meetings” and the kidnapping as “volunteer” actions.199 He
wrote that the events were a conflict between “Americans and half-breed Mexican
Indians . . . impecunious, illiterate . . . vicious.”200
3. Native American Children and Cultural Assimilation
As mentioned in Part I.A, it was not until 1940 that all Native Americans were
able to acquire citizenship at birth.201 Hostility toward Native Americans led to
government practices that removed Native American children from their parents in
order to force cultural assimilation.
As early as colonial times, missionaries undertook to “educate” Native
American children.202 In 1819 the federal government created the Civilization Fund
that provided grants to churches to develop programs that would “civilize the
Indian.”203 The Commissioner of Indian Services provided a report to Congress in
1867 stating that the only way to deal with the “Indian problem” was to separate
children from their tribes.204 In the late 1860s President Grant directed church
missionaries, as part of his Peace Policy, to “Americanize” Native Americans

193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 278–79.
196. Id. at 279.
197. Id. at 294.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub L. No. 76-853, § 201(b), 54 Stat. 1138.
202. Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil Rights,
5 NEV. L.J. 141, 145 (2004) (describing how Native American families have been “subject to
brutal disruption and whose culture has been so heavily and forcefully devalued under color
of law”).
203. Testimony of the National Indian Child Welfare Association: Hearing on S. 569 and
H.R. 1082 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs and H. Res. Comm. 1, 105th Cong. (June
18, 1997), available at http://www.nicwa.org/legislation/HR2750/nicwa_testimony.pdf
[hereinafter Testimony of the National Indian Child Welfare Association].
204. Id.
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through education and to provide social services for the purpose of
“pacification.”205
Native American families were torn apart in an effort to assimilate Native
American children into mainstream Anglo culture. For example, federal practices in
1884 included placing Native American children on farms in the East and Midwest
so that they would learn the “values of work and the benefits of civilization.”206
Around the same time period, the government and private institutions established
mission boarding schools. As part of this program, children were forcibly removed
from their homes and placed in boarding schools.207
Comments by the founder of one of the first boarding schools illustrate how the
goal of these schools was in essence to cultivate a preferred identity—one that
reflected Anglo norms. The founder, Colonel Richard Pratt, said in 1892:
A great general has said that the only good Indian is a dead one, and
that high sanction of his destruction has been an enormous factor in
promoting Indian massacres. In a sense, I agree with the sentiment, but
only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill
the Indian in him, and save the man.208
He went on to explain that former slaves were able to assimilate because of their
association with the “higher race” (that is, slave owners), but that the Native
American remained a “savage.” He stated:
The schools did not make [African Americans] citizens, the schools did
not teach them the language, nor make them industrious and selfsupporting. Denied the right of schools, they became English-speaking
and industrious through the influences of association. Scattered here
and there, under the care and authority of individuals of the higher race,
they learned self-support and something of citizenship, and so reached
their present place. No other influence or force would have so speedily
accomplished such a result. Left in Africa, surrounded by their fellowsavages, our seven millions of industrious black fellow-citizens would
still be savages. Transferred into these new surroundings and
experiences, behold the result. They became English-speaking and
civilized, because forced into association with English-speaking and
civilized people; became healthy and multiplied, because they were
property; and industrious, because industry, which brings contentment
and health, was a necessary quality to increase their value.
The Indians under our care remained savage, because forced back
upon themselves and away from association with English-speaking and

205. THE HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 50, at 236.
206. Testimony of the National Indian Child Welfare Association, supra note 203, at 1.
207. Id.; see also THE HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 50, at 200.
208. Charla Bear, American Indian Boarding Schools Haunt Many, NPR (May 12, 2008,
12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16516865 (quoting Col.
Richard Pratt).
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civilized people, and because of our savage example and treatment of
them.209
In cultivating this preferred identity, or “Americanizing” the Indian, the
orchestrators viewed their efforts as necessary for the preservation of a civilized
Anglo society. The Federal Board of Indian Commissioners in 1880 noted:
As a savage, we cannot tolerate him any more than as a half-civilized
parasite, wanderer or vagabond. The only alternative left is to fit him by
education for civilized life. The Indian, though a simple child of nature
with mental facilities dwarfed and shriveled, while groping his way for
generations in the darkness of barbarism, already sees the importance
of education . . . .210
Though federal policies in the 1930s shifted away from placing Native
American children in boarding schools, the destruction of Native American
families continued. In 1959 the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the U.S. Children’s
Bureau, and the Child Welfare League of America developed the “Indian Adoption
Project,” which removed approximately 400 Indian children from their homes and
placed them with white families in the East and Midwest.211 The project lasted until
1967.212 It is estimated that between 1941 and 1978, sixty percent of Native
American children were removed from their homes and placed either in orphanages
or with white families.213
Recognizing that “there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children,” Congress passed the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) in 1978.214 At the time of its passage, extensive
testimony described the harmful effects these practices had on Native American
families and the preservation of Native American culture. During congressional
hearings, one tribal chief noted:
Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly reduced if
our children, the only real means for the transmission of the tribal
heritage, are to be raised in non-Indian homes and denied exposure to
the ways of their People. Furthermore, these practices seriously

209. Richard H. Pratt, The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites, in
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN” 1880–
1900, at 260, 263 (Francis Paul Prucha ed. 1973).
210. THE HARVARD PROJECT, supra note 50, at 201.
211. Id. at 237.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (2006). As a result of the passage of ICWA, greater procedural
protections are provided when an Indian child is involved in child welfare proceedings. In
the context of termination of parental rights, it must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that the child will be emotionally or physically harmed if he remains with the parent.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2006). Additionally, because of ICWA’s emphasis on preservation of
culture, when deciding out-of-home placements for Indian children, preference is to be given
first to extended family, then to families of the same tribe, and when that is not possible,
other Indian families. 25 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006).
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undercut the tribes’ ability to continue as self-governing communities.
Probably in no area is it more important that tribal sovereignty be
respected than in an area as socially and culturally determinative as
family relationships.215
He went on to convey how these practices were being carried out because of
cultural biases and ignorance and reflected attempts to destroy Native American
cultural identity:
Indian children are removed from the custody of their natural parents
by nontribal government authorities who have no basis for intelligently
evaluating the cultural and social premises underlying Indian home life
and childrearing. Many of the individuals who decide the fate of our
children are at best ignorant of our cultural values, and at worst
contemptful of the Indian way and convinced that removal, usually to a
non-Indian household or institution, can only benefit an Indian child.216
Early child welfare practices toward Native Americans and immigrants illustrate
how negative perceptions about their culture, race, class, and values led to practices
that devalued and destroyed their family relationships. Though members of the
dominant Anglo society justified these actions in the name of protecting children,
they were also efforts—some more explicit than others—to cultivate a preferred
Anglo-American identity or to remove the threat of a competing identity.
II. CONTEMPORARY HOSTILITY TOWARD UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
Part I provided a historical overview of how immigration and citizenship laws,
as well child welfare practices, excluded groups whose culture, race, class, and
values did not align with the dominant Anglo-American culture.
This Part explores how current anti-immigrant sentiment frames perceptions
about Latino immigrants. First, changes in migration patterns that have resulted in a
large influx of Latino immigrants into previously homogenous communities have
resulted in hostility toward newcomers. Second, these tensions, along with a
pervasive national anti-immigrant rhetoric, have led to increased legislation at the
state and local level, which seeks to make life so prohibitive for undocumented
immigrants that they will presumably self deport.217 Combine these local measures

215. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 34 (1989) (quoting
Hearing on S. 1214 Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs & Pub. Lands of the H. Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong. 193 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearings]
(statement of Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians)).
216. Id. at 34–35 (quoting 1978 Hearings, supra note 215, at 191–92 (statement of
Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief, Missisippi Band of Choctaw Indians)).
217. McKanders, supra note 39, at 177; see also MARC R. ROSENBLUM & KATE BRICK,
REG’L MIGRATION STUDY GRP., U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND MEXICAN/CENTRAL
AMERICAN MIGRATION FLOWS: THEN AND NOW 2 (2011), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/rmsg-regionalflows.pdf (explaining the factors that
motivate migration, including push and pull factors and social networks). “Push factors”
refer to conditions in the sending country, which encourage outflow of members of the
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with harsh federal immigration laws that focus enforcement efforts largely on the
criminal justice system, and the result is that the identity of the undocumented
immigrant is transformed into not only a violator of immigration laws, but also a
criminal and culturally deviant person.
A. Changing Migration Patterns & Community Tensions
In 2010 estimates placed the number of undocumented immigrants within the
United States at approximately 11.2 million.218 Though there was a slight decline in
migration over the past two years, the undocumented population has tripled since
1990.219 Of the 11.2 million undocumented immigrants, 8 million are in the
workforce.220
Migration patterns have also changed largely as a result of industries—such as
meatpacking—that rely upon undocumented labor relocating from large urban
centers to small rural communities.221 Between 2000 and 2009, for example, the
Central American populations doubled in Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Washington—states that in the past have
not had large immigrant populations.222
Today, immigrants are residing in previously homogenous communities where
“[t]he sense of who is a newcomer spans generations, not years; counties, not
countries.”223 These migration changes have led to tensions within many
communities.224 For instance, in 2006 in Grand Island, Nebraska, Latinos
comprised eleven percent of the town’s population of 450,000.225 Since Latinos did
not begin arriving until the 1980s, this growth occurred fairly rapidly.226 One native

population. These conditions include poverty, lack of economic opportunities in the sending
country, and government instability. Id. The “pull factors”—those that make the United
States a destination country—include demand for low-skill/low-wage workers and economic
opportunities. Social networks refer to the communities of individuals from the sending
country already present in the United States. These networks connect migrants to jobs and
other resources, easing the transition for newcomers. See id.
218. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 43, at 1.
219. Id. at 2.
220. Id. at 1.
221. See Anna Williams Shavers, Welcome to the Jungle: New Immigrants in the
Meatpacking and Poultry Processing Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 31, 60 (2009)
(describing the meatpacking industry’s move from urban to rural locations).
222. ROSENBLUM & BRICK, supra note 217, at 16 (indicating that the Central American
population in each of these states grew by at least 50,000 people in the last decade).
223. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, “Latina/o-ization” of the Midwest: Cambio de Colores
(Change of Colors) as Agromaquilas Expand into the Heartland, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J.
343, 345 (2002); see also McKanders, supra note 39, at 165–66 (explaining that many
communities throughout the United States have witnessed a large influx of Latino
immigrants in recent years).
224. See Vargas, supra note 223.
225. Kate Linthicum, A Modern Tale of Meatpacking and Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Jan.
28, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/28/nation/la-na-immigrant-nebraska28-2010
jan28.
226. See id.
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of Grand Island noted, “A lot of people don’t like the Latinos, they just don’t.”227
He went on to state, “There has been more bigotry . . . because there has just been
more and more and more of them.”228 When ICE raided the Swift meatpacking
plant in 2006 and other Latino immigrants protested afterward outside the factory,
some townspeople held up signs reading, “Go back to Mexico, wetbacks.”229 As
one scholar noted, “When faced with a sudden, destabilizing change in local
demographics, and when a salient national rhetoric politicizes that demographic
change, people’s views turn anti-immigrant.”230
The demographic changes also place new economic constraints on communities.
School districts must respond to the growing needs of Limited English Proficient
(LEP) students.231 Lack of affordable housing and social services for low-income
Latino residents create financial strains as well.232
B. Anti-Immigrant Legislation and the Criminalization of Immigration Violations
In recent years, states and local governments have increasingly passed antiimmigrant legislation and ordinances. Additionally, the federal government has
expanded the relationship between the immigration and criminal justice systems.
These efforts have contributed to the exclusion and marginalization of Latinos.233
In 2011, 1607 bills and resolutions regarding immigration were introduced by
state legislatures.234 Not all of the legislation was “anti-immigrant.” Some laws

227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. Interestingly, and supporting the argument presented in this Article, antiimmigrant hostility within certain communities makes undocumented Latino immigrants
more susceptible to the loss of their parental rights. For instance, two termination of parental
rights cases involved undocumented parents who had been living in Grand Island, Nebraska.
As noted in the text, Grand Island, Nebraska experienced a large influx of immigrants that
resulted in tension between long-time residents and newcomers. See State v. Maria L. (In re
Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009); In re Mainor T., 674 N.W.2d 442
(Neb. 2004).
230. MASSEY & SANCHEZ, supra note 19, at 76 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Daniel J.
Hopkins, Threatening Changes: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local
Opposition 34 (Yale Univ. Ctr. for the Study of Am. Politics, Working Paper, 2008)).
231. See Vargas, supra note 223, at 351. During an ethnographic study conducted in a
rural community in Iowa, one researcher noted that poor Mexicans who were newcomers to
the community “posed a significant challenge to the community identity of the town’s white
European residents.” See Burton et al., supra note 18, at 92.
232. See id. at 360 (“The costs and consequences of rapid immigration have put pressure
on affordable housing, social services, and local school districts, and have vexed local law
enforcement officers unable to speak Spanish.”).
233. See McKanders, supra note 39, at 166–67.
234. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRATION POLICY REPORT: 2011
IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (2011), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-immigration-legislation-report-dec
-2011.aspx [hereinafter IMMIGRATION POLICY REPORT] (citing examples from Alabama,
Indiana, Georgia, South Carolina, and Utah of laws requiring law enforcement to verify the
immigration status of individuals during a lawful stop and making it a violation for failing to
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sought to combat human trafficking,235 provide in-state tuition to those without
lawful immigration status,236 and provide services to undocumented immigrants.237
The top issues addressed by most of the legislation, however, continued to be “antiimmigrant,” and concerned issues such as driver’s licenses, unauthorized
employment of undocumented immigrants, and cooperation between local and
federal law enforcement officials (287(g) programs) to enforce immigration
laws.238
These anti-immigrant measures have ranged from high profile multi-issue
legislation to the passage of local anti-immigrant ordinances. The most high profile
legislation, of course, has been Arizona’s S.B. 1040.239 Other states, such as
Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Utah, and Indiana have followed Arizona’s
lead.240 Additionally, five states introduced legislation in 2012 that would require
law enforcement officers to request proof of immigration status during lawful
stops, allow undocumented immigrants to be charged criminally for failure to carry
documents that demonstrate lawful immigration status, and would create penalties
for the harboring and transportation of undocumented immigrants.241 In recent
years, local governments, such as in Hazleton, Pennsylvania; Freemont, Nebraska;
and Valley Park, Missouri, have passed ordinances, which were later challenged in
court, that sought to prohibit undocumented immigrants from renting housing,
obtaining public benefits, and working.242

carry an alien registration card).
235. Id. (providing an example where Missouri passed a law that would allow victims of
human trafficking to receive English language instruction and interpretation and translation
services).
236. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2011 STATE IMMIGRATION
LEGISLATION: NSCL’S IMMIGRANT POLICY PROJECT 9 (2011), available at
www.ncsl.org/documents/immig/2011ENACTEDbystate.pdf (noting that Connecticut
passed a law that would allow those without lawful immigration status to receive in-state
tuition if certain criteria are met).
237. See, e.g., IMMIGRATION POLICY REPORT, supra note 234 (noting that Indiana passed
a law that would establish a domestic violence fatality review team and would provide child
care for migrants if domestic violence was found and that a Colorado appropriations bill
included a line item that would provide funds for refugee assistance).
238. See id.
239. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2012).
240. For a summary of these states’ bills, including Alabama’s H.B. 56, Georgia’s H.B.
87, Indiana’s S.B. 590, South Carolina’s S. 20, and Utah’s H. 116, H. 466, H. 469, H497 see
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, IMMIGRATION POLICY PROJECT: STATE
OMNIBUS IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION AND LEGAL CHALLENGES(2012), available at http://
www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/omnibus-immigration-legislation.aspx.
241. See id.
242. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding an ordinance that
prohibited renting to undocumented immigrants preempted), vacated, 131 S.Ct. 2958 (2011);
Gray v. City of Valley Park, 567 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2009) (challenging an ordinance that
prohibited landlords from renting to undocumented immigrants and prohibited employers
from hiring individuals not authorized to work); Keller v. City of Fremont, 853 F. Supp. 2d
959 (D. Neb. 2012) (holding in part that city ordinance barring landlords from renting to
undocumented immigrants not preempted by federal law), aff’d in part and rev’d in part,
719 F.3d 931 (2013).
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Additionally, with the expansion of crimes leading to deportation, the
immigration system has become more and more integrated into the criminal justice
system.243 Over the years, Congress has expanded the list of crimes that lead to
deportation.244 Local law enforcement is increasingly entering into Memoranda of
Understanding with ICE to coordinate enforcement efforts.245 In 2011 immigration
offenses accounted for nearly thirty-five percent of criminal prosecutions in federal
court.246
Moreover, while Congress has not imposed criminal sanctions for workers who
work without authorization,247 workplace raids have led to the prosecution of
thousands for aggravated identity theft, social security fraud, and other crimes
relating to the use of false documents, reinforcing the image of undocumented
immigrants as dangerous lawbreakers.248 This is not to minimize the significance of
identity theft, but the criminal label that attaches to the undocumented immigrant
who wanted to work seems incongruous.249
The criminalization of immigrants and a national anti-immigrant rhetoric foster
negative stereotypes about Latinos.250 These stereotypes portray Latinos as
dangerous and culturally deviant. A U.S. Representative for Oklahoma, John
Sullivan, in support of efforts to train local sheriffs to enforce immigration laws
under the federal government’s 287(g) program, stated that “[he] want[ed] to create
fear in rapists, drunk drivers, drug dealers and people who conceal weapons,”
associating immigrants with dangerous criminal behavior.251 A sheriff in North
Carolina, who is under investigation by the Department of Justice for racial

243. See generally Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky, A New Chapter in Supreme
Court Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful Permanent
Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 16–21 (2011); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis:
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006).
244. See Maddali, supra note 243; Stumpf, supra note 243.
245. Maddali, supra note 243; see also Wessler, supra note 15, at 27 (noting that in
communities that have 287(g) agreements with ICE, children in foster care were 29% more
likely to have a detained or deported parent compared with 3.8% in other counties).
246. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR
2011 5 (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Research
_Publications/2012/FY11_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf.
247. Leticia M. Saucedo, Immigration Enforcement Versus Employment Law: The Case
for Integrated Protections in the Immigrant Workplace, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 303, 306
(2011).
248. Id. at 308–09 (2011) (describing ICE’s workplace immigration enforcement and the
immigration and criminal sanctions that undocumented immigrants face when arrested
during a worksite raid); see also Bosniak, supra note 29 (describing the undocumented
worker’s dual identity as insider and outsider).
249. See Juan F. Perea, A Brief History of Race and the U.S.-Mexican Border: Tracing
the Trajectories of Conquest, 51 UCLA L. REV. 283, 309 (2003) (describing how the
agricultural industry relies on migrant farm workers, but the laborers “are condemned as
illegal and criminal”).
250. See MASSEY & SANCHEZ, supra note 19, at 68–80 (arguing that the pervasive themes
in the media and in politics frame Latinos as a threat to the country).
251. Kari Huus, Turmoil in Tulsa: The Illegal Immigration Wreck, NBC NEWS (July 17,
2007, 7:31 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/19466978/#.UnlHAxZkhUQ.

678

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:643

profiling, stated: “Their values are a lot different, their morals, than what we have
here . . . . In Mexico, there’s nothing wrong with having sex with a 12-, 13-year-old
girl . . . . They do a lot of drinking down in Mexico.”252
Such stereotypes affect all Latinos—irrespective of immigration status. “Latin
Americans living in the United States are probably more vulnerable and exploitable
than at any point in American history.”253
III. TERMINATIONS OF PARENTAL RIGHTS OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
In their book, Brokered Boundaries: Creating Identity in Anti-Immigrant Times,
Douglas Massey and Magaly Sánchez explore the role that anti-immigrant
sentiment and hostility play in shaping the experiences of Latinos in the United
States. In doing so, they look specifically at discrimination toward Latino
immigrants in the workplace. This Article, and this Part in particular, seeks to
explore how negative perceptions of Latino immigrants—and specific notions
about what culture and values are best for their children—can impact parental
fitness determinations and can lead to a devaluation of certain family relationships,
often in a manner that violates the legal rights of both children and parents.
Like the historical practices discussed in Part I, contemporary views about
undocumented immigrants may be influencing decisions to terminate parental
rights. Negative perceptions about Latino parents—their language, race, culture,
immigration status, national origin, and class—lead to biased assessments about
their fitness as parents and their children’s best interests. Informing these biases
may be an underlying belief that cultivating an “American” rather than a “Latino”
identity is best for children—particularly U.S.-citizen children of undocumented
parents—and best for the United States. More precisely, issues of race and culture
become intertwined with attitudes about immigration policy and what the racial and
cultural makeup of the United States should be.
The historical child welfare practices described in Part I reflected policies and
practices aimed at removing children from parents who had been deemed
undesirable. Contemporary actions taken against undocumented parents are not part
of an official policy or practice to tear these families apart. But the terminations of
parental rights that are occurring today, which often go unnoticed, are just as
troubling because the effects are similar—they tear families apart because of biases
surrounding the identity of the parent.

252. Billy Ball, Criminal Minds: Racial Profiling in Almance County, INDYWEEK.COM
(Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/criminal-minds-racial-profiling-in
-alamance-county/Content?oid=3126336.
253. MASSEY & SANCHEZ, supra note 19, at 79; see also McKanders, supra note 39, at
166 (describing how anti-immigrant laws “targeting undocumented immigrants . . . are also
directed at all Latinos who are perceived as unwilling to assimilate to American cultural
values. These laws encourage and lend legitimacy to exclusion of ‘the other’—the Latino
other”).
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A. Undocumented Parents’ Rights Are Protected Under the Constitution
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “no State shall ‘deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.’”254 The Due Process Clause
requires more than fair process.255 When fundamental rights and liberty interests
are at stake, heightened protection must be afforded against governmental
interference.256
The right to parent one’s child is “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests” recognized by the Supreme Court.257 As the Supreme Court noted,
parents’ fundamental interest in raising their child “does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their
child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital
interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”258
A parent’s right in this regard is not absolute, however. The State, as parens
patriae, has an interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of children within
its jurisdiction and can intervene in situations of abuse, abandonment, and neglect
and terminate parental rights.259 Because a state possesses enormous power, a
parent must be found unfit by clear and convincing evidence.260 “Few
consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural family
ties.”261 This higher standard balances the rights of natural parents with the State’s
parens patriae interests.262 After a finding of unfitness, a court will then assess
whether termination is in the child’s best interest.263
An undocumented parent’s interest in raising her child is no less fundamental
than a citizen parent’s interest. Undocumented immigrants are considered
“persons” entitled to due process and equal protection under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.264 The “Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’
within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful,
unlawful, temporary or permanent.”265
B. Termination Proceedings and Undocumented Parents
Biases within child welfare departments and juvenile courts about
undocumented immigrants are influencing assessments about their fitness as
parents. Some of these termination decisions purport to be about the best interests
of the child—like the historical examples discussed in Part I—but these decisions

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XIV).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
Id. at 766.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See id. at 769 (majority opinion).
Id. at 760.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).

680

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 89:643

also reveal tensions around identity and how best to cultivate a preferred American
identity.266
Determining the motivations influencing each of these decisions is, of course,
difficult, and there are likely many different and competing ones. The termination
cases discussed below involved parents who required assistance and support, and,
as is the case in many best interest assessments, there was likely a “better” family
available to care for the child.267 As one family court judge observed, “One
wonders if any natural parents of children in foster care could pass muster if the
superior capabilities of the foster parents are the measure of ‘best interests.’”268 At
the same time, issues that are raised in these decisions, such as a comparison of
resources between the United States and that of the parent’s country, the parent’s
undocumented immigration status, the “un-American” culture and values of the
parent, do reveal the way biases creep into and influence parental fitness and best
interest determinations involving immigrant parents and their children. I posit that
underlying these biases may be a larger tension around identity (“American” versus
“other”), and a conscious or unconscious assessment by decision makers about
which identity is better for children.
1. Immigration Status
Some courts and child welfare departments explicitly discriminate against
undocumented parents because of their undocumented immigration status, equating
this status with abuse and/or neglect.269 An attorney in Michigan, for instance,
stated that during one termination proceeding, his department argued that an

266. Cultural and racial biases often undermine termination of parental rights
proceedings. In 1971 the Supreme Court in Santosky v. Kramer noted:
Permanent neglect proceedings employ imprecise substantive standards that
leave determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge. . . .
In appraising the nature and quality of a complex series of encounters among
the agency, the parents, and the child, the court possesses unusual discretion to
underweigh probative facts that might favor the parent. Because parents subject
to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of minority
groups, . . . such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on
cultural or class bias.
455 U.S. at 762–63. In the early 1980s a divorced, Caucasian mother lost custody of her
daughter because she married an African American man. The Supreme Court noted that
“private biases and the possible injury they might inflict” were impermissible considerations.
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). In the context of termination proceedings
involving undocumented parents, while cultural and racial biases are present in many of
these decisions, I argue here that the tension between an American identity and an “other” or
(more often than not) Latino identity also pervades these assessments.
267. See State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009)
(“[U]nless [the undocumented mother] is found to be unfit, the fact that the State considers
certain adoptive parents, in this case the foster parents, ‘better,’ or this environment ‘better,’
does not overcome the commanding presumption that reuniting the children with [their
mother] is in their best interests—no matter what country she lives in.”).
268. ROBERTS, supra note 69, at 113.
269. WESSLER, supra note 15, at 51–55.
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undocumented father was “abusive or neglectful of his child because he is an illegal
alien who is in danger of being arrested every time he walks out the door.”270
According to this attorney, “[T]he theory is that because of his immigration status
and lack of contingency plans for his child, should he be arrested on an
immigration hold, he places his child at a substantial risk of harm.”271 Another
attorney who works for the child welfare department in Jacksonville, Florida,
shared a similar view noting:
Typically, as a policy, we are reluctant to recommend a placement with
a parent that we know is not legally here, because our position
representing the best interests of the child is to ensure [they] have
permanency and not set them up for further disappointment. To be
placed back with a parent that may at any time be deported is not truly
in the best interest of children. . . . [A]s a policy for the program, we
typically don’t like to make those recommendations knowing full well
that the parent is not documented.272
A juvenile court in Georgia terminated an undocumented father’s parental
rights, indicating that he “had done nothing to legalize his residency in the United
States.”273 After the court found that the mother failed to comply with her
reunification plan, in part because she “lived with and financially relied upon a man
who . . . was an illegal alien,” it terminated her parental rights.274 With regard to the
decision concerning the father’s parental rights, the appellate court reversed the
decision, noting that the father had complied with the reunification plan and made
meaningful efforts to maintain a parental bond with his child.275 The court stated
that the father’s parental rights were terminated by the juvenile court not because of
parental misconduct, but because of the possibility that the father could be
deported.276 The court went on to explain: “A court may not sever a parent-child
relationship solely because it has determined that the child might enjoy certain
advantages elsewhere.”277 Though it was a physical altercation between the mother
and father that led to state intervention, the juvenile court’s bias surrounding the
father’s immigration status provided the basis for terminating his parental rights.
While the appellate court reversed and noted that the possibility of deportation to a
less affluent country cannot serve as a basis for termination of parental rights, it did
not explicitly address the strong bias relating to immigration status and “illegality”
that permeated the juvenile court’s decision.278

270. Id. at 53 (describing, in addition, similar views held by child welfare authorities in
Maricopa County, Arizona; Cabarrus County, North Carolina; and Collier County, Florida).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 52–53 (omissions in original).
273. In re Interest of M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825, 832 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
274. Id. at 829.
275. Id. at 832.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Thronson, supra note 40, at 54 (“[E]ven as it reversed the decision, the appellate
court relied on factual disagreements; it did little to discredit the trial court's naked reliance
on immigration status as a basis for decision.”).
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Likewise, the juvenile court in Encarnación Maria Bail Romero’s termination
case—the case mentioned in the Introduction—determined that Bail Romero’s
undocumented immigration status supported its finding that she was an unfit, lawbreaking mother.279 The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the initial termination
and adoption and remanded the case back to the juvenile court, but it did not
acknowledge the bias and hostility surrounding her status.280
Unsurprisingly, on remand the same juvenile court focused extensively on Bail
Romero’s and her relatives’ immigration status. Through its repeated references to
the illegal status of her relatives,281 Bail Romero’s status as a “convicted felon,”282
her previous unlawful employment and presence in the United States without
authorization, which the court referred to as “criminal activity,”283 and her
testimony that she would cross the border illegally again,284 the court painted a
picture of a law-breaking mother to bolster its finding of unfitness. At one point the
decision stated:
Ms. Romero and her family were always at risk of being arrested and
deported. Yet, even with a newborn son, she elected to remain at risk in
the United States instead of returning to Guatemala where she had two
other children that she had not seen for years, an extended family and,
perhaps most importantly, lawful residency.285
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in affirming the juvenile court’s second
decision terminating the mother’s parental rights, found that the juvenile court did
not improperly focus on the mother’s immigration status.286 The Court of Appeals
described her immigration status as “an unavoidable fact” and noted that it
“properly played a part in reviewing Mother’s past behavior, predicted future
behavior, and possible future harm to Child.”287

279. See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 18, 2012) (on
file with author).
280. See S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011).
281. In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477 at *12 (noting that Bail Romero at
one point lived with her brother, “an illegal alien”); id. at *13–14 (stating that her brother
and his girlfriend “were illegally in the United States and subject to deportation”); id. at *14
(noting that Bail Romero’s sister was “illegally in the United States”).
282. Id. at *36–37 (finding that her status as a “convicted felon” barring her entry into the
United States and her willingness to commit more offenses by crossing the border illegally
again demonstrated that her ability to parent Carlos had not improved).
283. Id. at *36 (noting that the totality of the circumstances demonstrate Bail Romero’s
unfitness including her “continued engagement in criminal activity after the birth of the
minor child, her continued failure to seek information about him, her medical, physical and
nutritional neglect of him, her continued failure to provide support for him, her continued
failure to attempt to communicate or contact him, and her expressed intentions to reengage
in new criminal activity [cross the border again] along with her two children from Guatemala
should [sic] be deported in the future”).
284. Id. at 36–37.
285. Id. at 31.
286. In re Adoption of C.M., No. SD322228, at *70 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2013).
287. Id. at *71.
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As the above cases demonstrate, in termination proceedings, a parent’s
immigration status can be used to show that the parent not only violated
immigration laws, but, by extension, is also an irresponsible and unfit parent. In
some ways, these negative perceptions toward undocumented parents mirror
congressional legislation that has increasingly criminalized immigration
violations.288 As Congress—and even some states—transforms traditionally civil
immigration violations into criminal ones, the label attached to the violator also
changes. Undocumented immigrants no longer commit civil immigration offenses,
but instead criminal ones. And the criminal label attaches to the undocumented
person.
This criminal characterization has permeated family law assessments. The
law-breaking father who could not legalize his status became an unfit parent who
could not offer a stable life to his child. Similarly, Bail Romero’s violation of
immigration laws and use of false documents served as evidence of a mother who
was continuing to engage in criminal activity, placing her child at risk.
David Thronson—one of the first scholars to explore the intersection of
immigration and family law—noted that “[j]udges who discriminate on the basis of
immigration status reflect acceptance, consciously or otherwise, of a pervasive
societal narrative that constructs an expanding notion of unworthiness and
‘illegality’ regarding undocumented immigrants and a diminished popular sense
regarding the availability of protection from prejudice and discrimination.”289 This
expanding notion of illegality has the potential to construct the personhood of the
undocumented parent and to influence assessments concerning parental fitness.
Crossing the border unlawfully and living in the United States as an
undocumented person can be precarious for children and parents, but characterizing
this as parental unfitness ignores the complicated choices parents face and the
limited options available to provide for their children. By taking a broader view, the
actions of undocumented parents should represent equities in the child welfare
context.290 Often, these are parents who desperately want to care for and provide
for their children, which can be their primary motivation for migrating.291 In
Bail Romero’s situation, though she was convicted of a felony for using fraudulent
documents, she used these identity documents to work and provide for her
children.292 Likewise, as a single mother, her decision to leave two of her children

288. See Thronson, supra note 40, at 55–60.
289. Id. at 54–55.
290. Brief of the Young Center for Immigrant Children’s Rights at the University. of
Chicago et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant at 12, S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re
Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011) (“Viewed through the prism of
immigration enforcement, working without government authorization is a negative factor.
But child welfare systems are not engaged in federal enforcement of immigration law and
policy. Viewed through the prism of child welfare, a parent’s decision to work in order to
feed, clothe and educate a child is a positive, even necessary parenting trait.”).
291. See Deborah A. Boehm, “For My Children:” Constructing Family and Navigating
the State in the U.S.-Mexico Transnation, 81 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 777, 786 (2008).
292. Interview by Laura Davenport with Encarnación (Angelica) Alvarado (Aug. 25,
2009) [hereinafter Encarnación Interview] (explaining to Davenport that by working “we get
ahead with children” and that she left Guatemala “[b]ecause I wanted to do more. That’s
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behind in Guatemala is one that many undocumented parents are compelled to
make in order to support their families. As noted by anthropologist Deborah
Boehm, “For mothers . . . the motivations to migrate are especially complicated—
women typically migrate to reunite with a male partner or because of the necessity
to work after being abandoned by a spouse. Transnational parenthood, and
particularly ‘transnational motherhood’ . . . is indeed riddled with difficult
decisions, ambivalent emotions, and multiple negotiations in the face of limited
options.”293
Immigration status is not always an irrelevant factor in child welfare
proceedings.294 For instance, it may be a necessary consideration in determining
child custody when one parent is deported but the other remains in the
United States. It is also an appropriate consideration when assessing the family’s
situation, generally.
The use of immigration status in child welfare proceedings becomes a problem
when it is used to characterize a parent who is here unlawfully as illegal, unworthy,
and automatically an abusive and/or neglectful parent simply by virtue of her
undocumented immigration status. This leaves all undocumented parents—who
work without authorization, cross the border unlawfully to provide for their
families, and live without documentation in the United States knowing that they
may be deported—at risk of termination of their parental rights because they are
undocumented.
2. Culture and Values
In some termination decisions, greater emphasis is placed on American cultural
values, which is often to the detriment of the parent’s culture. In In re B.A.,295 for
example, the parental rights of an undocumented mother from Mexico, who was
serving a twenty-one-month sentence, were terminated by a district court in
Iowa.296
The district court stated that there was no “practical alternative” to terminating
the mother’s parental rights, despite the fact that the mother provided the child
welfare department with the names and contact information of relatives in Mexico

why I left . . . . If God doesn’t allow me to continue here, then I’ll have to go back to
Guatemala.”).
293. Boehm, supra note 291, at 788.
294. Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Interests of the Child Standard, 14
VA J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 97–101 (2006) (noting that a possible solution regarding the
consideration of immigration status in child custody disputes is to presume that immigration
status is not relevant but provide courts with specific types of cases in which it could be
rebutted); see also David B. Thronson & Judge Frank P. Sullivan, Family Courts and
Immigration Status, 63 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 1, 13 (2012) (“The appropriate line in child
custody matters cannot be, or at least cannot always be, drawn to enforce absolute silence
about immigration status.” Instead, they advocate restricting the introduction of information
concerning immigration status “to instances where immigration concerns are demonstrably
relevant on an individualized basis [to prevent] the introduction of material for
discriminatory purposes.”).
295. 705 N.W.2d 507 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished table decision).
296. Id. at *1.
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who could care for her children until her release.297 The Mexican Consulate
arranged a home study, conducted criminal background checks of the relatives, and
offered to make arrangements for the placement of children with their relatives.298
Still, child welfare authorities refused to place the children with them.299 Instead,
over the course of eighteen months the children were placed with five foster
families—none of whom the children had previously known.300 The department, in
fact, terminated one placement because of allegations of excessive drinking and sex
parties.301
The State argued that terminating the mother’s rights was in the best interests of
her children because they had never been to Mexico and did not know their
relatives there.302 The district court agreed, stating:
Though the boys were very bonded to their mother at the time of her
arrest, that bond has naturally diminished. Bryan and Richard are
clearly bonded to their current foster parents who have gone to great
lengths to assist the boys in maintaining contact with their mother and
will likely continue that contact in the future. Because of the passage of
time and the lack of another practical alternative, Bryan and Richard
are now fully integrated into the English-speaking, Iowa culture. They
are six- and four-year-old boys who were dual citizens of Mexico and
the United States but who have never been to Mexico. They live in a
safe, nurturing home with foster parents who hope to adopt them and
will encourage the boys to remain aware of their now dual heritage.
Termination of parental rights is clearly in their best interests.303
The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the termination, highlighting the special
relationship between the children and their mother, and the mother’s ability to care
for them.304 Though the end result was positive, the fact that the juvenile court
based its decision on the children’s integration into the English speaking, Iowa
culture is troubling. Essentially, the transmission of the English language and
“Iowan” values were afforded greater weight than the mother’s constitutional right
to raise her children and the strong bond that existed between her and her children.
In another termination case involving undocumented parents of a U.S.-citizen
child, a physician, who treated the child for anemia and an ear infection, reported
the family to child welfare services because of the child’s failure to thrive.305 Child
welfare services placed the child in foster care while the parents received services
to facilitate reunification.306 At the termination hearing, numerous social workers
testified that the parents had made significant progress in improving their parenting

297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at *2.
Id.
See id. at *3.
Id. at *1–4.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *4–6.
In re Interest of S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 75–76 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 77–81.
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skills.307 Yet the jury found that the parents engaged in conduct that endangered the
child’s well-being, a finding the appellate court affirmed.308 The dissent, however,
highlighted something subtle, yet important, that may have influenced decision
makers:
[I]t is noteworthy that Child Welfare said that this child is “adoptable”
and they are planning to place him with an American family. While it is
true that this child was “Born in the U.S.A.” his heritage and culture are
Hispanic. To tear asunder the parent-child bond would also entail
separating him from his brothers, sisters, grand-parents, etc. This would
destroy the extended family bond that is especially important. It cannot
be said that it is in this child's best interest to be torn apart from not
only his parents but his other relatives that love him, and be placed with
strangers.309
This statement is a keen observation of a possible underlying preference by
some decision makers to have U.S.-citizen children placed with American families
who can transmit American values to the children. Far less weight, particularly
when the parents’ resources are limited, is given to those social goods that
undocumented parents can transmit and to the importance of family bonds.
3. National Origin, Class, and Life as an Undocumented Immigrant
A parent who comes from a poorer country, such as Mexico or Guatemala, is
more vulnerable to termination of parental rights—not necessarily because of
parental unfitness, but because of the belief that a more prosperous life in the
United States would be better for their children.310 One child welfare attorney
stated: “When you break down the cases, placement with parents in Mexico
happens very rarely. In my cases it might have happened every five years. The
kneejerk reaction of almost everyone is that children are better off in [the] U.S.”311
An undocumented father’s rights were terminated because he wanted to bring his
children to Mexico. The attorney explained:
The father had taken sole custody of the children after charges were
filed against the mother. He had never been accused of any neglectful
behavior. Through [sic] the judge was otherwise ready to close the case
entirely and let the family live without CPS [Child Protective Services]

307. See id. at 80–81 (summarizing testimony by social workers who believed parents
were making progress and that termination was not appropriate). One social worker noted
that parents’ problems were due, in part, to “cultural differences.” Id. at 79.
308. Id. at 86–91.
309. Id. at 97.
310. See In re Doe, 281 P.3d 95, 102 (Idaho 2012) (noting that the fact that
undocumented father was deported to Mexico and would raise his children there was not a
basis for terminating parental rights); WESSLER, supra note 15, at 46 (noting that one
attorney in El Paso, Texas, explained that very few children are returned to Mexico because
the common assumption is that life in the United States is in the best interest of the child).
311. WESSLER, supra note 15, at 46.
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supervision, the judge refused to do so because the father said he
wanted to go to Mexico. The lawyer for the department made the
allusion that the kids couldn’t be better off in Mexico, so why would
we want them to go there? I argued that it was in the best interest of the
children to let them be with their father, but the court did not see it that
way.312
A juvenile court in Michigan terminated the parental rights of undocumented
parents following their deportation, stating that it was in the U.S.-citizen children’s
best interests to live in the United States.313 After unsubstantiated allegations of
abuse, the Department of Child Welfare Services actually informed ICE of the
parents’ undocumented status, which led to their deportation.314 Following the
parents’ deportation, the court determined that the children—three of whom were
U.S. citizens—would have a “better and more prosperous life in the United States
than in Guatemala.”315 The decision was reversed on appeal.316
The belief that it is in children’s best interests to remain in the United States
without their parents than in a poorer country with their parents represents
socioeconomic, racial, cultural, and global inequity that plays out in this context as
a cultural clash. As the above cases and comments by attorneys illustrate, part of
this clash has to do with the weight given to certain factors, like prosperity and
educational opportunities, at the expense of others, such as the parent/child
relationship and the language and culture of one’s biological parents.317 A
statement by one attorney, in support of his department’s unofficial policy of not
reunifying deported parents with their children, exemplifies the emphasis placed on
certain social goods. He states, “Most of our [Mexican] parents don’t have
education themselves; they are poor and they don’t have the ability to pay for
further education.”318
Decision makers also fear sending children to a country about which they may
know very little. In some instances, neither the consulate nor child welfare services
in the parent’s country of origin were contacted.319 Instead, assumptions were made
about the country and what life would be like there for the children.320 In another

312. Id. at 47.
313. In re B., 756 N.W.2d 234 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008).
314. Id. at 237.
315. Id. at 241.
316. Id. at 242.
317. For instance, one guardian ad litem, supporting the termination of an undocumented
father who the Idaho Supreme Court found to be fit stated: “I think it’s in the best interest of
[the daughter] obviously to remain in the United States because there’s no comparison
between being in Mexico and being in the United States, being a United States citizen. She
has all the luxuries or all the things that we can offer.” In re Termination of Parental Rights
of Doe, 281 P.3d 95, 102 (Idaho 2012).
318. WESSLER, supra note 15, at 46.
319. Id. at 47–50 (noting that few child welfare departments contact foreign consulates).
320. See In re B., 756 N.W.2d at 238 (indicating that a caseworker contacted the
Guatemalan embassy and “performed an Internet search for possible services in Guatemala”
but was not successful in obtaining services for Guatemalan parents); State v. Maria L. (In re
Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 94 (Neb. 2009) (court noting on appeal that the
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situation, discussed supra, though the Mexican consulate remained actively
involved—providing homes studies and criminal background checks of relatives in
Mexico—child welfare authorities were “skeptical” about placing children with
relatives in Mexico while their parents were incarcerated in the United States.
Instead, child welfare authorities placed the children with five different foster
families in the United States.321
A parent’s poverty in the United States and every day restrictions attendant with
life as an undocumented immigrant can also lead to state intervention. As legal
scholar Dorothy Roberts notes, poverty continues to be used in the child welfare
context as evidence of a parental deficit that justifies state intervention rather than a
social deficit.322 This is a chronic problem that leaves poor parents, and particularly
poor parents of color, vulnerable to state intervention. It has a unique impact on the
undocumented parent.
Undocumented persons are denied most public benefits.323 Based on the
percentage of undocumented immigrants living below the poverty line,324 having
Guatemalan government had the resources to monitor the children’s well-being and that the
State initially failed to make greater efforts to involve the consulate to keep the family
unified); Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL
1847638, at *3 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (affirming trial court’s finding that the evidence
in the child welfare department’s petition to terminate parental rights was insufficient and
noting that the “trial court would have to speculate about the children’s future because the
department offered no information about the situation in Ghana and made no efforts to
determine the conditions there”).
321. In re B.A., 705 N.W.2d 507 at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished table
decision) (noting that the Mexican Consulate arranged for a home study of relatives who
could care for children while parents were incarcerated in the United States). The consulate
advised child protection workers in the United States that Mexico’s child protection agency
would supervise the children to “assure their well-being.” Id. at *2. In spite of the
consulate’s detailed home study and criminal background checks of relatives, the
Department “remained skeptical” and did not approve the placement. Id. at *3.
322. See ROBERTS, supra note 69, at 33–35 (2002). “The child welfare system is designed
to detect and punish neglect on the part of poor parents and to ignore most middle-class and
wealthy parents’ failings. Although the meaning of child maltreatment shifted from a social
to a medical model, it retained its focus on poor families. The system continues to
concentrate on the effects of childhood poverty, but it treats the damages as a symptom of
parental rather than societal deficits.” Id. at 33. Roberts describes how children are more
likely to be removed from neglectful parents rather than physically abusive parents and how
children whose parents cannot find decent housing that is affordable are more likely to be
placed in foster care by child welfare workers. Id. at 35; see also Appell, supra note 69, at
584 (explaining that because poor families are more likely to rely on public transportation,
receive public benefits, and are generally exposed in an array of other ways, their parenting
practices receive more exposure than wealthier parents who can afford their own cars, hire
nannies and hire attorneys if they find themselves in legal trouble, placing them more at risk
of state intervention); Wallace & Pruitt, supra note 69, at 115 (noting that poor families who
receive public benefits are four times more likely to be investigated by child protective
services and to have their children removed).
323. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, § 400(3), (5), 110 Stat. 2105 (limiting the public benefits available to
undocumented immigrants).
324. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 33, at iv (“A third of the children of unauthorized
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no social aid poses enormous challenges and can lead to allegations of neglect.325
Inability to obtain public benefits can also affect the services that are provided to
the parent after the state has intervened. If an undocumented immigrant cannot
show that she completed her case plan and received all necessary services, she may
be denied reunification with her children.326
In a termination case mentioned above, child welfare services indicated that the
child was malnourished.327 Child welfare workers stated that his parents fed him
milk, tortillas, sopas, eggs, and beans,328 and indicated that this diet was too heavy
in dairy and lacking in vegetables and meat.329 Aside from cultural differences in
diet, the parents’ limited resources also influenced the food he was served. The
dissent noted that the parents, undocumented immigrants from Mexico, were
ineligible for food stamps and welfare benefits, and the only form of public
assistance they were receiving were Women, Infants, and Children (WIC)
benefits.330 WIC provided milk, cheese, and cereal, so “[i]t naturally follows that
the child's diet was heavy on milk and dairy products.”331
Bail Romero’s situation highlights the difficulties faced by undocumented
immigrants because of restrictions placed on every day life and because of
immigration enforcement. For instance, when a Parents as Teachers (PAT) worker
visited Bail Romero in jail, following Bail Romero’s arrest during a workplace
raid, she stated that Bail Romero’s son was weak because Bail Romero gave him
whole milk rather than 2 percent.332 Bail Romero explained that she did not have a
ride to the city to pick up formula offered through the WIC program.333 Davenport
found Bail Romero’s response dubious, noting that Bail Romero had previously
obtained rides to go to work.334 Bail Romero replied that people without documents
are afraid to drive.335

immigrants and a fifth of adult unauthorized immigrants lives in poverty. This is nearly
double the poverty rate for children of U.S.-born parents (18%) or for U.S.-born adults
(10%).”).
325. See, e.g., In re Interest of V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490, 493 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (reversing
a juvenile court order that terminated an undocumented father’s parental rights, in part,
because of the father’s failure to obtain basic child care items for his seven month old son
and failure to find a place to live).
326. Perez-Velasquez v. Culpeper Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., No. 0360–09–4, 2009
WL 1851017, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 30, 2009) (noting that though child welfare services
worked with the mother after her children were removed from the home as a result of the
mother leaving the children unsupervised while she went for a job interview, these services
were limited “because mother was an illegal immigrant”); WESSLER, supra note 15, at 54–55
(explaining that child welfare authorities often do not place children with undocumented
relatives because these relatives cannot access needed public benefits and cannot be provided
with the resources to financially support these children).
327. In re Interest of S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 75–76 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
328. Id. at 86.
329. Id. at 93.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Encarnación Interview, supra note 292, at 3.
333. Id. at 8.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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Child welfare departments may deny reunification based on activities that most
undocumented immigrants engage in—driving without a license and working
without authorization. For example, some child welfare departments refuse to
reunify an undocumented parent with her child if she drives without a license.336
This refusal significantly disadvantages undocumented parents because, in virtually
every state throughout the United States, undocumented immigrants are prohibited
from obtaining drivers’ licenses.337 Therefore, they either rely on public
transportation, or, if they live in areas where public transportation is unavailable,
they must decide whether to drive—often to work—without a license.338
Similarly, in certain jurisdictions, a parent who is unable to show evidence of a
lawful source of income—for instance, with pay stubs—cannot reunify with her
child because she has no acceptable documentation to prove she has the means to
provide for her child.339
Immigration detention can also thwart parents’ efforts to communicate with
their children. While visiting with Bail Romero in jail, Davenport told Bail Romero
that she waited too long following her arrest to communicate with family to let
them know what happened to her.340 Bail Romero stated that she did not call
because there was no telephone available.341 She explained that once she learned
that she could make calls, she worried that the collect calls would be too expensive
for family members.342 In fact, when she did try to call, her family members did not
accept the calls because of the cost.343 Nonetheless, Bail Romero noted, “Right
now, I want to communicate with my son, but I don’t want to cost anybody
anything. I wish I could call where my son is.”344 Yet both the Missouri Supreme

336. See WESSLER, supra note 15, at 20–21 (explaining that in Oscelo County, Florida,
and Maricopa and Pima counties in Arizona, lack of verifiable employment can prevent
reunification with children, and that in Duplin County, North Carolina and Austin, Texas,
driving without a license is used as evidence that the parent did not comply with the case
plan).
337. As a result of the REAL ID Act, in order for driver’s licenses to be used for federal
identification purposes, the state must ensure that licenses are issued only to U.S. citizens or
nationals and those with lawful immigration status. REAL ID Act of 2005, H.R. 418, 109th
Cong. § 202(c)(2)(B). Most states adhere to this practice because not doing so would deny
their residents the ability to use their licenses for federal identification purposes. See
LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 12, at 1225–28.
338. See State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74, 85 (Neb. 2009)
(involving one undocumented mother whose rights were terminated because she did not
bring her sick child to the hospital even though she explained to child welfare authorities that
she thought her child was better and that she did not have a car or a ride to get to the
hospital).
339. See WESSLER, supra note 15, at 20; see also In re Interest of V.S., 548 S.E.2d 490,
493 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that the juvenile court found father’s inability to obtain
permanent employment with benefits constituted a reason for terminating his parental
rights).
340. Encarnación Interview, supra note 292, at 10.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 11.
344. Id.
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Court and Juvenile Court faulted Bail Romero for not maintaining sufficient
contact with her son nor expressing a personal interest in his welfare.345
4. Denial of Legal Protection
When undocumented families are subjected to exclusion, they are increasingly
denied legal protection. This becomes justifiable because the parent is
undocumented and, by extension, neglectful. The denial of legal protection can and
does subvert the fundamental rights of undocumented parents.346 Bail Romero’s
situation most vividly illustrates this point.
In Bail Romero’s case, assistance from an employee of a well-respected statefunded organization, Parents as Teachers, whose mission is to support and
strengthen families, determined that Bail Romero’s family was not worth saving.347
Laura Davenport, a PAT employee, assisted Bail Romero after her son Carlos was
born. After Bail Romero’s arrest, when it appeared that her relatives were
struggling to care for Carlos, Davenport stepped in.348 She was concerned about

345. See S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793, 817 (Mo.
2011).
346. The Southern Poverty Law Center filed a complaint on behalf of an immigrant
Mexican mother whose daughter was taken from her in the hospital two days after her
daughter’s birth by officials with the Mississippi Department of Human Services. Complaint
at 2, Cruz v. Miss. Dep’t Human Servs., No. 3:10cv446HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. Aug. 12,
2010), available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/case-docket/cruz. Someone from
the social services department and a Spanish-speaking patient advocate questioned the
mother in the hospital, in Spanish, despite the fact that the mother only spoke an indigenous
language, Chatino. Id. at 6. Department officials claimed that the mother admitted to trading
sex for housing and that she wanted to give her child up for adoption. Id. at 7. The child was
removed from the hospital and given to a white attorney couple in Mississippi, who regularly
practiced before the judge that approved the adoption. Id. at 1. The daughter was eventually
returned to the mother after the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for
Civil Rights and the Administration for Children and Families conducted an investigation
into the matter. Id. at 20–21.
347. In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *12, *15–16 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July
18, 2012) (on file with author). For more information about the Parents as Teachers program,
see About Us, PARENTS AS TEACHERS, http://www.parentsasteachers.org.
348. See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *15–16. This raises
interesting questions about the dependent relationship that may form between a person
providing assistance and the parent. The parent may come to rely on this person, but this
reliance and vulnerability may expose the parent in ways that can be detrimental to the
parent. This represents a difficult situation because a mandated reporter is required to inform
authorities when a child’s well-being is in danger. At the same time, the provision of
services allows a parent to learn and improve upon parenting skills, which can create
dependency on the child welfare workers. In the termination of parental rights case In re
Interest of S.H.A., the parents did not immediately take their child to the doctor because they
did not have the money or transportation to do so. 728 S.W.2d 73, 95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987)
(McClung, J., dissenting). Instead, they contacted the social worker who had been providing
assistance to the family. Id. They believed the social worker could take the child to the
doctor the following day. Id. Because the parents did not take the child immediately, he was
removed from the home. Id. Yet the dissent noted:
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Carlos’s welfare.349 Yet even though she was a mandated reporter,350 based on the
record, it does not appear that Child Protective Services was ever contacted.
Instead, she asked one couple to help take care of Carlos and then later, knowing
of a local couple that was interested in adopting a Latino child, Davenport visited
Bail Romero in jail in order to solicit Carlos’s adoption.351 During her visit, she told
Bail Romero not to “think of adoption as something ugly.”352 When Bail Romero
told her that she wanted to return to Guatemala with Carlos, Davenport replied:
But this is a pretty story that you are thinking so you don’t have to [go]
back alone. You’re not thinking about the well-being of your son.
You’re only thinking about yourself. It is true you are the mother. You
did give birth to him. But that is not true love when you’re not thinking
about the best for your child. Because the future of your child in
Guatemala is not good. You have two children already there who your
sister takes care of. You don’t have another sister to take care of
another child[.]353
She later told Bail Romero that if she raised him in Guatemala, Carlos would not
have an education, and “[h]e’ll just be a factory worker.”354 She also stated that it
was “a blessing from the Lord that they picked you up.”355
Davenport also asked questions of Bail Romero relating to sexual/reproductive
matters. She asked Bail Romero whether there were men in the prison, and
Bail Romero replied that there were but the men and women were separated.356
Immediately after, Davenport asked Bail Romero whether her tubes were tied.357 At
the very end of the conversation, Davenport questioned Bail Romero about what
she was doing in Guatemala before coming to the United States.358 Bail Romero
responded that she was working, trying to come to the United States and “wasn’t
doing other things.”359 Davenport stated, “[w]ell, you were doing ‘other things,’
While these workers’ substantial efforts to assist the family in whatever way
possible are to be applauded and encouraged, it is cruel and unfair to allow
these parents to become dependent on the Child Welfare Department and then
have the department use acts of the parents caused by this dependency as a
basis for terminating their parental rights.
Id.
349. In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *15–16 (noting that the child was
being fed whole milk, had not received proper immunizations, was slow both to sit up and
crawl, had poor muscle development, and it is unclear whether Carlos was examined by any
medical staff during this time period).
350. Carthage R-IX Sch. Dist. v. Homa, at *10 (Bd. of Educ. of Carthage R-IX Sch. Dist.
Aug. 31, 2009) (on file with author) (providing that Davenport’s boss, Lynda Homa,
admitted during a hearing before the Board that she was a mandated reporter).
351. Id. at *6.
352. Encarnación Inteview, supra note 292, at 11.
353. Id. at 3.
354. Id. at 4.
355. Id. at 3.
356. Id. at 10.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 13.
359. Id.
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because you had Carlos. So, you weren’t just working. You were doing ‘other
things.’”360
The school board later terminated Davenport’s boss from her position, finding
that she engaged in “immoral conduct” as a result of approving Davenport’s jail
visit.361
Less than a month after this visit, one local couple, the Velazcos, who
Davenport identified to help care for Carlos and who for a few months had assisted
Bail Romero’s relatives in caring for him, gave Carlos to another couple, the
Mosers, who were interested in adopting a child.362 Two days after their first
overnight visit with Carlos, the Mosers moved to terminate Bail Romero’s rights
and adopt Carlos.363
The denial of legal protection continued. Bail Romero was not listed on the
notice for a hearing to transfer custody, nor was it sent to her. 364 The summons and
petition that were served to her were in English, even though she did not read or
speak English.365 She lacked counsel for months.366 Approximately eight months
after the initial petition was served, the Mosers, the couple interested in adopting
Carlos, hired an attorney for her.367 When the juvenile court held the termination
hearing, Bail Romero was not present.368 The only people who offered testimony
were the Mosers, the Velazcos, and Davenport.369 The juvenile court terminated
Bail Romero’s parental rights and approved the adoption.370
Missouri law is meant to protect parents from transfers prior to the filing of a
court petition in order “to prohibit the indiscriminate transfer of children, the
concept that a parent could pass them on like chattel to a new owner.”371 Those
who are authorized to place a child for adoption in Missouri include: the family
services division of the Department of Social Services, a licensed child placing
agency, the child’s parents, or an intermediary, which the statute states may be a
licensed attorney, licensed physician, or clergy of the parents.372 The Velazcos
asserted that they were clergy, though they were never Bail Romero’s clergy, and,

360. Id.
361. Carthage R-IX Sch. Dist. v. Homa at *18 (Bd. of Educ. of Carthage R-IX Sch. Dist.
Aug. 31, 2009) (on file with author).
362. See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *21 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 18,
2012) (on file with author).
363. S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793, 802 (Mo. 2011)
(noting that the Velazco’s first overnight visit with Carlos was on October 3, 2007 and a
petition was filed October 5, 2007).
364. Id. at 803.
365. Id.; In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *23.
366. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d, at 803.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See id.
370. See id. at 804.
371. Peggy v. Michael (In re Baby Girl), 850 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Mo. 1993).
372. MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.14 (West 2003 & Supp. 2013) (emphasis added).
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therefore, not authorized to place Carlos with the Mosers.373 On appeal the
Missouri Supreme Court found no manifest injustice and justified the actions,
noting that Carlos needed immediate care.374
Child welfare services did not intervene until nearly five years after the first
termination hearing, which prevented Bail Romero from receiving services to
facilitate reunification with her son.375 Under the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act (AFSA), child welfare agencies are required to show that they made
reasonable efforts to provide assistance and services to families to prevent the
removal of a child from the home, and, if the child has been removed, to achieve
reunification with the parent.376 While some states specify certain circumstances in
which reasonable efforts need not be provided, none under Missouri law applied to
Bail Romero’s situation.377 Instead, Bail Romero was faulted for not availing
herself of services like a public defender who would have been able to provide her
with contact information for child welfare authorities,378 or utilizing volunteers in
jail to translate documents for her.379
Additionally, most of the information provided to the juvenile court about
Bail Romero came from Davenport. Though Davenport undoubtedly wanted to
help, and believed she was acting in Carlos’s best interests, her own cultural and
racial biases about Bail Romero framed how the juvenile court viewed
Bail Romero. It was Davenport’s testimony that characterized Bail Romero as a
neglectful mother who fed her son two-percent milk instead of formula, lived with
too many people in one apartment, and co-slept with her son on a pallet on the
floor.380 This testimony continued to be relied upon even in the second termination
opinion to support the court’s conclusion that Bail Romero neglected her son.381
To be sure, it is possible that Bail Romero might have been subjected to similar
biases by child welfare workers, which could have hindered her ability to reunify

373. See Appellant’s Substitute Reply Brief at 14–15, S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption
of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011) (No. SC 91141) (on file with author) (noting that
the Velazcos were not clergy of Bail Romero).
374. In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d at 803.
375. See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *51–52 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July
18, 2012) (on file with author) (“In this matter, the minor child was never under the care of
the Children’s Division and the termination of parental rights action was brought by the
Mosers instead of the State in connection with their adoption petition as allowed by law.”).
376. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500.
377. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.183 (West 2010 & Supp. 2013) (providing that
reasonable efforts need not be made when the parent has murdered a child of the parent;
committed voluntary manslaughter of a child of parent; aided or abetted, conspired or
solicited to commit such murder or manslaughter; committed a felony assault that seriously
injured child or another child of parent; or subjected child to severe or recurrent acts of
physical, emotional, or sexual abuse).
378. See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *20.
379. See id. at *25.
380. Id. at *12–13.
381. See id.; see also S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793,
801–02 (Mo. 2011) (noting that Bail Romero fed Carlos whole milk, slept on a the floor with
him, and that the living conditions were “poor”).
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with Carlos. Additionally, Bail Romero made mistakes and likely needed additional
support.382 Yet the actions taken against her evidence the sheer vulnerability
undocumented parents face. Parents have a fundamental interest in raising their
biological children and this interest “does not evaporate simply because they have
not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the
State.”383
The biases toward undocumented Latino parents impact how they are treated in
juvenile court when assessments are made concerning their parental fitness and the
best interests of their children. Ultimately, these decisions become value
assessments that afford greater weight to certain social goods—such as wealth,
Anglo-American cultural values, and the English language—and diminish the
social and cultural goods of their parents, and by doing so afford less protection to
their constitutional right to raise their children. Undocumented parents cannot
change the resources available in their country of origin, most cannot legalize their
status, and they cannot change their native language and culture. Yet it does not
follow that they should also lose their children.
C. The Prevalence of the Problem
Undocumented parents are losing their parental rights. The exact number of
cases is difficult to determine because juvenile court decisions are frequently
sealed.384 Moreover, most family court decisions are not appealed.385 Studies such
as the one conducted by the Applied Research Center, however, reveal that these
cases are not rare.386 As one judge in Southwest Florida commented:

382. For instance, during the second termination proceeding, it was revealed through
hospital records from Carlos’s birth that Bail Romero had left the hospital while Carlos was
still in the nursery. Bail Romero did not notify anyone that she was leaving. She did return to
bring Carlos home with her. See In re Adoption of Romero, No. 07AO-JU00477, at *34–35.
383. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
384. See WESSLER, supra note 15, at 22–25; see also UNIV. OF ARIZ., supra note 16, at 2
(stating that through its research, attorneys, judges, and case workers all reported experience
with cases involving parents in immigration detention or deportation proceedings); Rabin,
supra note 16, at 114–18 (2011) (noting that because the child welfare system and ICE do
not collect this information, it is difficult to determine the number of the families affected).
The Department of Human Services Inspector General reported that from 1998 to 2007,
108,434 parents of U.S.-citizen children were deported. Rabin, supra note 16, at 114.
Additionally, Rabin conducted surveys and interviews of personnel in the Pima County
Juvenile System to determine the frequency with which children are involved with the child
welfare system as a result of a parent’s deportation. Based on the information she gathered,
Rabin concluded that “the numbers of such cases in the system suggest that immigration
status arises frequently enough for it to be an issue about which personnel in the child
welfare system are aware, but not so frequently that they are accustomed to dealing with
such cases in a prescribed, uniform manner.” Id. at 118.
385. See Thronson, supra note 40, at 54 (noting that few family court decisions are
appealed).
386. See, e.g., In re M.M., 587 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); In re Termination of the
Parental Rights of Doe, 281 P.3d 95 (Idaho 2012); In re B., 756 N.W.2d 234 (Mich. Ct. App.
2008); In re Adoption of C.M.B.R., 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011); State v. Maria L. (In re
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Our child protection system has had very little, almost non-existent
success at reunifying children, whether born in the USA or in a foreign
country, with parents who come to the USA (1) undocumented, (2)
poor, (3) uneducated/illiterate, (4) unable to communicate in English,
(5) culturally segregated. . . . If children of these parents come into
care, they are virtually doomed by these five factors and the probability
of permanent loss of these children is overwhelmingly high.387
There are 5.5 million children in the United States with at least one
undocumented parent.388 Three quarters of these children are U.S. citizens.389 With
increased immigration enforcement, parents and children living in mixed status
households face the threat of separation. For example, from approximately 2000 to
2009, the government deported over 100,000 parents who had U.S.-citizen
children.390 The Applied Research Center (ARC) conservatively estimates that
there are currently 5,100 children in foster care that have either a parent detained by
ICE or a parent that has been deported, representing 1.25 percent of the total foster
care population.391 According to the ARC, “If these rates continue through the next
five years, at least 15,000 additional children will face threats to reunification with
their detained and deported mothers and fathers.”392
There are various ways that children of undocumented parents come into contact
with the child welfare system. When an undocumented parent is arrested by ICE—
for instance, during a workplace raid—and later detained, it can cause family
separation, which then may result in state intervention.393 In other instances, an
undocumented parent is investigated for or charged with abuse or neglect.394 ICE
Interest of Angelica L.), 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009); State v. Mercedes S. (In re Interest of
Mainor T.), 674 N.W.2d 442 (Neb. 2004); In re Interest of E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796 (Tex.
2012); see also Complaint at 2, Cruz v. Miss. Dep’t Human Servs., No. 3:10cv446HTWLRA (S.D. Miss. Aug. 12, 2010), available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/case
-docket/cruz; WESSLER, supra note 15, at 22–24.
387. WESSLER, supra note 15, at 18.
388. PASSEL & COHN, supra note 33, at 7.
389. Id.
390. AJAY CHAUDRY, RANDY CAPPS, JUAN MANUEL PEDROZA, ROSE MARIA CASTANEDA,
ROBERT SANTOS & MOLLY M. SCOTT, URBAN INST., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE
AFTERMATH OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 1 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org
/UploadedPDF/412020_FacingOurFuture_final.pdf.
391. WESSLER, supra note 15, at 23.
392. Id.
393. See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 390, at 13–26 (describing family separations as a
result of immigration enforcement); see also S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of
C.M.B.R.), 332 S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011) (undocumented mother arrested during a workplace
raid).
394. See, e.g., Anita C. v. Superior Court, No. B213283, 2009 WL 2859068 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 8, 2009) (finding that mom, who plead guilty to child cruelty for leaving children
alone while she worked, and who lived in unhygienic living conditions, supported
termination of her parental rights); In re B., 756 N.W.2d 234 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008)
(reversing termination involving undocumented parents whose rights had been terminated by
the juvenile court following their deportation); State v. Maria L. (In re Interest of Angelica
L.), 767 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 2009) (reversing termination of mother’s rights in which mom
who identified herself to police as the babysitter was arrested for obstructing a government
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may be notified in these circumstances, resulting in the parent’s apprehension by
ICE and subsequent removal from the United States.395 Even if these reports are
unsubstantiated at a later date, the parent’s deportation may become the
justification for termination of parental rights.396 Some cases involve an
undocumented parent who is incarcerated because of a criminal conviction,
resulting in separation from his or her child.397 After completion of the criminal
sentence, the parent may be deported.398
Because of family separations due to immigration enforcement, as well as
reports indicating that undocumented parents are losing their parental rights,
Congress recently introduced legislation aimed at protecting immigrant children
operation, her children were taken into protective custody, and she was later taken into
custody by ICE, deported, and had her parental rights terminated); State v. Mercedes S. (In
re Interest of Mainor T.), 674 N.W.2d 442 (Neb. 2004) (reversing termination of mother’s
parental rights in case where mom’s striking of child led to incarceration, ICE placing an
immigration hold on her, and her deportation); State v. Lopez-Navor, 951 A.2d 508 (R.I.
2008) (upholding termination of mother’s rights where mom did not report her husband’s
abuse of her children to the police, arguing that her status as an undocumented immigrant
made her afraid to report husband to the police, which the Rhode Island Supreme Court said
was not a defense); In re Interest of S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding
termination of parental rights of undocumented parents accused of neglecting their sixteenmonth-old son).
395. See, e.g., In re B., 756 N.W.2d at 237; In re Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at
82; In re Interest of Mainor T., 674 N.W.2d at 449.
396. During investigation by child welfare workers, one mom was arrested and placed in
removal proceedings. As a result of her deportation, a petition for termination of her parental
rights was filed because of her failure to comply with the case plan and because her children
had spent more than fifteen months of the most recent twenty-two months in foster care. See
In re Interest of Angelica L., 767 N.W.2d at 84. In another case, child welfare authorities
reported the parents to ICE and then used their deportation to construct a claim of
abandonment. See In re B., 756 N.W.2d at 237. In Texas, a mom with six U.S.-citizen
children was charged with neglectful supervision and child endangerment after someone
reported seeing the mother’s three-year-old playing near a highway. WESSLER, supra
note 15, at 32. Border Patrol checked her criminal record, and she was charged with illegal
reentry because she had been deported previously. Id. Because she faced a minimum of two
years of incarceration and then deportation, her parental rights were terminated. According
to her attorney, “If she were a citizen, she would have been bonded out in 24 hours. She
would not have lost her kids.” Id.
397. See, e.g., In re Interest of C.T., 544 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding
termination of father’s parental rights, which had been terminated while he was incarcerated
because of a felony conviction); In re RH, 524 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding
termination of undocumented father’s parental rights who was incarcerated for cocaine
distribution); In re B.A., 705 N.W.2d 507 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished table decision)
(reversing the termination of mother’s parental rights where father pled guilty to conspiracy
to distribute methamphetamine and mother pled guilty to misprision of felony); Dep’t of
Children’s Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 975339 (Tenn. Ct.
App. April 26, 2005) (upholding termination of mother’s rights after she had been arrested
on felony theft charges, served her criminal sentence, was transferred to ICE custody, and
then deported); Fairfax Cnty. Dep’t of Family Servs. v. Ibrahim, No. 0821-00-4, 2000 WL
1847638 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000) (declining to terminate parental rights of Ghanaian
father who had been arrested, incarcerated for importing drugs, and deported).
398. See, e.g., Ahmad, 2005 WL 975339, at *1; Ibrahim, 2000 WL 1847638, at *1.
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and parents impacted by immigration enforcement. The Humane Enforcement and
Legal Protections for Separated Children Act introduced in the Senate would
require child welfare authorities, the Governor of the state, and relevant state and
local law enforcement officials to be notified before or, if that is not possible,
immediately after the commencement of immigration enforcement.399 The bill
provides that parents should be screened by social workers or case workers to
determine whether they have children and allow such individuals to make free,
confidential telephone calls to arrange for the care of their children.400 Moreover,
the bill also provides that parents detained as a result of immigration enforcement
should have access to their children, courts, child welfare agencies, and consular
officials.401 It would also require state child welfare agencies to develop policies
and trainings for handling cases involving children separated from undocumented
parents.402 A similar bill introduced in the House states that all decisions relating to
the care, custody, and placement of children should be in the best interest of the
child, “including the best outcome for the family of the child” and that such
decisions be “based on clearly articulated factors that do not include predictions or
conclusions about immigration status or pending Federal immigration
proceedings.”403 A companion bill introduced in the House, the Help Separated
Families Act of 2012, would prohibit a state from terminating parental rights of a
fit parent who has been deported unless the state has (a) made reasonable efforts to
identify, locate, and contact the parent of the child; (b) notified them of the intent of
the State to file the petition; (c) attempted to reunify the child with the parent, and
(d) it is determined that the parent is unfit or unwilling to parent the child.404
Additionally, the Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration
Modernization Act would allow deported parents with U.S.-citizen children to
return to the United States and apply for the Registered Provisional Immigrant
Visa, which would facilitate family reunification405 This legislation contains
provisions that instruct against the termination of parental rights of undocumented
parents because of deportation and/or detention, and would prohibit child welfare
departments from refusing to place children with undocumented family
members.406 Another provision would require child welfare workers to

399. Humane Enforcement and Legal Protections for Separated Children Act, S. 1399,
112th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2011).
400. Id. § 3(b)(1)–(2).
401. Id. § 4.
402. Id. § 6.
403. Humane Enforcement and Legal Protections for Separated Children Act, H.R. 2607,
112th Cong. § 6 (2011).
404. Help Separated Families Act of 2012, H.R. 6128, 112th Cong. § 6 (2012).
405. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, S. 744,
113th Cong. § 2101(b)(3)(B) (2013); see also Seth Freed Wessler, Immigration Bill Includes
Protections for Families Separated by Deportation, COLOR LINES (Apr. 17, 2013, 10:06 AM),
http://colorlines.com/archives/2013/04/immigration_bill_allows_some_deportees_with
_family_to_return_helps_unite_separated_families.html.
406. Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. § 2107(b)–(c) (2013) (noting, for instance, at § 2107(b) that “[a]
compelling reason for a State not to file (or to join in the filing of) a petition to terminate
parental rights . . . shall include: (A) the removal of the parent from the United States . . . or
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communicate with families in their primary language.407 Finally, in addition to this
legislation, ICE released a new policy aimed at protecting parental interests during
immigration enforcement, noting that it “will maintain a comprehensive process for
identifying, placing, monitoring, accommodating, and removing alien parents or
legal guardians of minor children while safeguarding their parental rights.”408
IV. THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF CULTIVATING A NATIONAL IDENTITY UNDER
FAMILY LAW
Legal scholar Marcia Yablon-Zug proposed that “[i]n reunification cases
involving parents facing deportation, the rights of children who are American
citizens should outweigh the rights of their noncitizen parents.”409 She argued that
in these circumstances a best interest approach should be followed, which would
allow for a fit undocumented parent’s rights to be terminated, if it is in the citizen
child’s best interests.410 According to Zug, the State has an interest in protecting
(B) the involvement of the parent in (including detention pursuant to) an immigration
proceeding, unless the parent is unfit or unwilling to be a parent of the child” and providing
at § 2107(c)(1)(B) that the “immigration status alone of a parent, legal guardian, or relative
shall not disqualify the parent, legal guardian, or relative from being a placement for a
child”).
407. Id. § 2107(c)(34); see also Wessler, supra note 405.
408. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, FACILITATING PARENTAL INTERESTS
IN THE COURSE OF CIVIL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 1 (2013), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/parental_interest_directive_signed.pdf
(providing that a Parental Rights Coordinator and Field Parental Rights Coordinators will
assist parents who are separated from their children as a result of immigration enforcement).
Among other things, the policy states that, when practicable, ICE will not transfer parents
who are in child welfare proceedings to a detention facility outside of the family court’s
jurisdiction. Id. at 4. The policy also directs ICE officials to detain parents in a location that
is accessible to the parent’s children and will facilitate parent/child visitation when required
by family court or child welfare proceedings. Id. The policy notes that, when practicable,
parents will be allowed to make in-court appearances when they are involved with child
welfare proceedings, or participate via video or teleconference. Id. at 4–5. The Field Parental
Rights Coordinators are directed to help make provisions for the child’s travel and
reunification with a parent who will be removed. If a parent has been removed and a family
court requires the parent’s in person presence, ICE, on a case-by-case basis, will determine
whether to facilitate the parent’s temporary return for these purposes. Id.
409. Zug, supra note 58, at 1172–79. In discussing the problems with a parental rights
approach in the context of immigrant children facing separation due to immigration
enforcement, Zug discusses the following issues that arise: (1) a state has an interest in
keeping U.S.-citizen children in America; (2) reunification to a country that is poorer and
where conditions may be dangerous may not be in a child’s best interests; (3) the differing
statuses of parent and child can create situations in which a parent does not act in the child’s
best interests; (4) in situations of abuse and/or neglect, after a parent has been deported, child
protective services no longer has oversight over the parents and child, and services for
parents may be limited in countries with fewer resources; and (5) reunification with a
deported parent may not provide stability and security for a child who has formed
attachments with foster parents.
410. Id. But see Sarah Rogerson, Unintended and Unavoidable: The Failure to Protect
Rule and Its Consequences for Undocumented Parents and Their Children, 50 FAM. CT.
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U.S.-citizen children of undocumented parents because when a child follows a
parent after deportation, American democratic ideals and values cannot be passed
on to children who are not only outside of the country but who also do not have
citizen parents to transmit them.411 Zug acknowledges that this solution is not
perfect and that there are other solutions to prevent such separations, but that these
other solutions “seem infeasible given the current political climate.”412 To be clear,
she does not argue that parents of different cultures are bad parents, only that the
State has an interest in keeping U.S.-citizen children in the United States when they
do not have citizen parents to transmit those democratic values to them. She
qualified her proposal by noting, “immigrant parents will only have their rights
terminated when termination is in their child’s best interests, and most of the time
termination will not be. Rarely will better resources or opportunities be enough, by
themselves, to overcome the benefits of remaining with a loving and caring
parent.”413
This Part argues against changing the standard for undocumented parents of
U.S.-citizen children and maintains that the same standard that is used in all
termination proceedings—first proof of parental unfitness and then an assessment
of the best interests of the child—should be applied. A state’s interest in
terminating parental rights does not begin until after a parent has been proven
unfit.414 As the Supreme Court recognized, “the State registers no gain towards its
declared goals when it separates children from the custody of fit parents.”415
Because of this, the State must first prove parental unfitness before assessing best
interests. 416
The problem with shifting the standard only when a case involves an
undocumented parent of a U.S.-citizen child, is that it has greater potential, because
the best interest standard is subjective and value-laden, to use the family as an
arena for cultivating a preferred identity. The history involving early immigrants, as
well as Native Americans, combined with contemporary termination cases
described in Part III, demonstrate the dangers of using the law to change family
composition in order to cultivate identity. When identity is cultivated under the
law, the culture and values of the dominant culture will likely prevail, leaving
members of a subordinate group—such as undocumented parents—excluded and
denied legal protection.
Removing the fitness threshold would further perpetuate the exclusion of
undocumented immigrants by suggesting that undocumented parents do not have a
fundamental interest in raising their children. When parents, and more specifically
a subset of parents, are denied this most basic and fundamental right, the value
ascribed to these family relationships is diminished, and it does not necessarily
protect children. 417 Instead, the denial of rights to undocumented parents infers that
REV. 580, 585 n.79 (2012) (cautioning against Zug’s suggested approach).
411. Zug, supra note 58, at 1151–52.
412. Id. at 1152–53.
413. Id. at 1181.
414. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766–67 (1982).
415. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972).
416. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766–67.
417. Martin Guggenheim, The Best Interests of the Child: Much Ado about Nothing?, in
CHILD, PARENT, & STATE: LAW AND POLICY READER 27, 29 (S. Randall Humm, Beate Anna
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their family bonds are somehow different and unworthy of protection. This does
hurt children because their biological parents are a part of their identity, even after
termination. When their parents are marginalized and excluded, by extension so too
are they.
Shifting to a best interest approach is likely to continue the comparison of
resources in the United States with those in the parent’s country of origin. This will
raise the question, would this child be better off in a village with no running water,
or in a home in the United States with a middle-class family?418 Such questions will
place undocumented parents in a quandary. Many, like Bail Romero, made the
decision to come unlawfully to the United States to provide for their children in
ways that they could not in their home country. In fact, “poverty and the promise of
opportunity are undeniably key drivers of migration.”419 Once the state intervenes,
the conditions from which they fled become the very conditions supporting their
separation from their children. Considering current practices that equate poverty
with neglect, it is difficult to imagine terminations not increasing if the standard is
shifted. 420
Zug’s concern that a child may return to a dangerous situation is an important
one.421 There may be circumstances where a child will indeed face serious harm
because of conditions in the parent’s home country, and the parent desires
reunification. While the parent may not be responsible for these conditions, the
choice to bring her child into a dangerous environment—which, of course, may be
a “choiceless choice”422—warrants a careful and thoughtful analysis of the
appropriateness of such a decision.423 But such an assessment should be based on

Ort, Martin Mazen Anbari, Wendy S. Lader & William Scott Biel eds., 1994) (arguing that
child custody cases are not really about the child’s best interests but are about the interests of
competing adults).
418. ROBERTS, supra note 69, at 121 (stating that when adoptive parents are able to
intervene in fitness hearings, “[d]eciding the best interests of children in this setting might
conjure up the question, Would this child be better off in the comfortable home of this white,
well-to-do couple or struggling on public assistance with that neglectful Black mother?”).
419. AARON TERRAZAS, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: POLICY
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES 5 (2011) (emphasis omitted); see also Brief of the
Young Center for Immigrant Children’s Rights at the University of Chicago et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellant at 13, S.M. v. E.M.B.R. (In re Adoption of C.M.B.R.), 332
S.W.3d 793 (Mo. 2011).
420. See In re B.A., 705 N.W.2d 507, *5 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (unpublished table
decision) (finding the department’s argument that termination of parental rights was in the
children’s best interests because they had never lived in Mexico insufficient because,
previously, the children had also never lived in Iowa but adjusted to their new environment
nonetheless).
421. Zug, supra note 58, at 1177.
422. Thronson, supra note 67, at 1211 (arguing that parents may be forced to make
arguments in immigration court that their U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident children
will face harm if their parents are deported in order to obtain immigration relief, or parents
may legitimately be concerned about their child’s welfare but equally concerned about
separation as a result of deportation).
423. Id. (“While other countries with different risks and opportunities provide
challenging factual inquiries and may take much more research than domestic cases, the core
of the inquiry and the process is the same. Just as the federal forum should not presume
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the premise that a parent does act in her child’s best interests unless clear and
convincing evidence suggests otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Undocumented parents are losing their parental rights. Some of these cases are
legitimately about abuse, abandonment, and/or neglect. But many of these cases
represent tensions around identity and how to cultivate that identity. Early child
welfare practices removed immigrant children from their parents so that they could
be raised in a more wholesome American setting. Similarly, Native American
children were taken from their families and shuttered off to boarding schools for
the purpose of assimilation into the Anglo culture. Recent termination of parental
rights may not be so far removed from this history. Biases toward undocumented
Latino immigrants affect assessments concerning their fitness as parents and their
children’s best interests. To characterize these assessments as strictly legal inquiries
ignores the underlying biases that taint such “objective” assessments. Ultimately,
when the law is used to cultivate identity, the rights of those who are racially and/or
culturally different from the dominant group are threatened.

capacity and authority to make custody determinations, the family court should not assume
the role of asylum adjudicator. Major challenges will lie with advocates and participants in
such proceedings to educate family courts to make reasoned decisions about the parent-child
relationship when possible removal to other countries is involved.”).

